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THE ACCESSION INSIGHT AND PATENT
INFRINGEMENT REMEDIES
Peter Lee*
What is the appropriate allocation of rights and obligations when one par-
ty, without authorization, substantially improves the property of another?
According to the doctrine of accession, a good faith improver may take ti-
tle to such improved property, subject to compensating the original owner
for the value of the source materials. While shifting title to a converter
seems like a remarkable remedy, this outcome merely underscores the eq-
uitable nature of accession, which aims for fair allocation of property
rights and compensation between two parties who both have plausible
claims to an improved asset.
This Article draws upon accession-a physical property doctrine with
roots in Roman civil law-to enhance patent law's treatment of technolog-
ical improvement. While patents and property exhibit significant
differences, this Article argues that accession-with some modification-
can provide valuable guidance for allocating rights and obligations when
an infringer substantially improves on another party's patented technolo-
gy. Drawing on the Supreme Court's decision in eBay v. MercExchange, it
proposes that courts apply accession in equitable determinations to deny
injunctive relief and compel "substantially improving" infringers to com-
pensate patentees through ongoing royalties. Accession would thus shift
meaningful ownership of enhanced technologies to improvers based in part
on their substantial contributions to those technologies. Such liability-rule
protection would ameliorate holdup in "blocking patents" scenarios, pro-
vide a viable alternative to the rarely used reverse doctrine of equivalents,
and encourage the dissemination of improved technologies. While this pro-
posal seems radical, this Article shows that elements of the "accession
insight" already appear in eBay and its progeny. The Article concludes by
exploring the theoretical implications of accession for the intersection of
patents and property.
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INTRODUCTION
George Wetherbee probably thought he had a pretty good deal. Relying
on a seemingly valid license, he chopped down $25 worth of trees on land
owned by another party and used the lumber to make barrel hoops valued at
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about $700.1 Unfortunately, Wetherbee's license was faulty, and the true
owners of the trees sued for return of the hoops derived from their wood.2 At
trial, Wetherbee argued to keep the hoops, testifying that he had acted in
good faith while significantly enhancing the value of the underlying lumber.
The trial court excluded this testimony and entered judgment for the plain-
tiffs. However, the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed on appeal.'
Invoking the doctrine of accession, the court observed, "[I]f a thing is
changed into a different species, as by making wine out of another's grapes
... the product belongs to the new operator, who is only to make satisfac-
tion to the former proprietor for the material converted."4 Applying
accession, the court held that if Wetherbee had acted in good faith and sub-
stantially transformed the underlying wood, title to the hoops would transfer
to Wetherbee as long as he compensated the original owners for the value of
the source materials.5
While George Wetherbee's story is real, now consider the hypothetical
story of his fictitious great-great-granddaughter, Dr. Georgiana Wetherbee.
Dr. Wetherbee is an engineer who invents and patents a revolutionary new
battery. After Dr. Wetherbee has invested in personnel and equipment to
start large-scale production of her battery, a firm sues her for patent in-
fringement. It turns out that Dr. Wetherbee's patented invention literally
infringes the broad, "genus" claims of a prior patent covering an older bat-
tery design. Given the existence of a "blocking patent, '6 Dr. Wetherbee and
the firm attempt to negotiate a license to allow Dr. Wetherbee to manufac-
ture the improved battery. However, high transaction costs, distrust between
the parties, and the firm's desire to extract as much surplus as possible derail
negotiations. The firm presses on with its infringement suit, threatening to
obtain and enforce an injunction against Dr. Wetherbee unless she pays an
exorbitantly high licensing fee. In the meantime, the improved battery sits in
limbo, and the prospects for commercializing it grow dim.
Although these two examples are distinguishable on many grounds, they
nevertheless revolve around a central question: What is the appropriate allo-
cation of rights and obligations when one party, without authorization,
substantially improves the property of another? In the physical property
realm,7 this question informs a curious line of cases involving individuals
who improve other people's chattels and parties who build houses on other
people's land.8 In the patent sphere, this question is critical to technological
improvement, particularly to instances in which a substantial technological
1. Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 312 (1871).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 321.
4. Id. at 315 (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *404).
5. Id. at 321.
6. See infra Section I.A.
7. I use the term "physical property" to encompass the traditional categories of both
real and personal property.
8. See infra Section III.A.
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advance infringes an existing patent. While these situations are quite dis-
tinct, this Article argues that physical property doctrine provides insightful
guidance for enhancing patent law's treatment of technological improve-
ment.
Patent law has a complicated relationship with property. While numer-
ous authorities have long recognized conceptual similarities between patents
and physical property,9 scholars have consistently questioned this compari-
son. 1° An important Supreme Court case dealing with patent infringement
remedies has further complicated the landscape. In eBay Inc. v. Mer-
cExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court first affirmed a conception of patents
as property and then clarified that "the creation of a [property] right is dis-
tinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that right."'"I Thus, the
Court implicitly acknowledged that protecting a property right did not nec-
essarily require a property rule, which is characterized by injunctive relief.' 2
In so doing, the Court rejected a per se rule favoring injunctions and estab-
lished a multifactor, equitable framework for determining the
appropriateness of injunctive relief following a finding of patent infringe-
ment.'3 As a corollary, the Court opened the door to protecting patents with
a liability rule, which is characterized in this context by allowing continued
infringement contingent on the defendant paying ongoing royalties to the
patentee.
This Article builds on eBay to show how traditional property principles
can illuminate a more fruitful approach to technological improvement in
patent law. This Article fully acknowledges that the analogy between patents
and physical property is not perfect. Rather than reject it wholesale, howev-
er, this Article explores a specific context in which the analogy is
surprisingly helpful.' 4 In particular, it argues that the traditional doctrine of
accession provides valuable insight for determining remedies when a new
technology substantially improves on but infringes an existing patent. Work-
ing within the eBay framework, this Article proposes that courts apply
accession principles-with some modification"5-to deny injunctive relief in
cases in which an infringing product substantially improves on a patented
invention. Rather, courts should compel the infringer to compensate the pa-
tentee through ongoing royalties. Drawing on concepts from physical
9. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
11. 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006).
12. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (distinguishing be-
tween property-rule protection, characterized by injunctive relief, and liability-rule protection,
characterized by monetary compensation).
13. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
14. Cf Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119,
152 (2003) (comparing minorities in the shareholder and constitutional contexts and noting
that "[s]uch intradisciplinarity seems especially appropriate to law, a discipline that relies on
analogical reasoning").
15. See infra Section IV.A. 1.
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property law, this Article argues that when a substantially improved technol-
ogy infringes a patent, courts should protect that patent with a liability rule
rather than a property rule.
In offering this proposal, this Article draws on (and, in some cases, chal-
lenges) previous scholarly applications of accession to intellectual
property,16 including the application of accession to inform patent infringe-
ment remedies.17 While commentators emphasize the technical difficulties
of protecting patents with liability rules, this Article finds new support for
the desirability and feasibility of applying the "accession insight" in recent
case law addressing patent injunctions and damages. Furthermore, it draws
on theoretical and empirical work to show that liability-rule regimes may be
highly conducive to private ordering between patentees and potential in-
fringers, thus mitigating a significant objection to such modes of patent
protection.
While accession takes many forms, this Article focuses on doctrines
governing "mistaken improvement" of someone else's personal property.18
Similar to Wetherbee, if A unknowingly trespasses on B's land, chops down
B's trees, and fashions the resulting wood into an exquisite chair, the doc-
trine of accession grants title to that chair to A, subject to A's compensation
of B for the raw materials. Of course, shifting title to a party who converts
personal property represents an extraordinary remedy. However, this out-
come merely underscores the equitable nature of accession, 19 which aims for
fair allocation of property rights and compensation between two parties who
both have plausible claims to an improved item.
Under this proposal, courts would consider the value of an infringing
improver's contribution over the original patent in determining appropriate
remedies. If the improvement is slight, then (all other things being equal)
traditional equitable principles would favor enjoining infringement. Thus, in
the vast majority of "infringing improvement" cases that merely involve
"incremental" improvement, accession would not apply. If, however, the
improver's contribution dominates the value of the improved technology,
then courts applying the eBay framework could deny injunctive relief. Such
improvement would be particularly apparent if the new technology trans-
formed the underlying patented invention (yet still infringed the patent).20 In
adapting accession to patent law, this proposal contemplates some diver-
gence from traditional doctrine, particularly with respect to the requirement
of good faith. For reasons explained below, good faith would be a factor that
16. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEG. ANALY-
SIs 459 (2009); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1527
(2009); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Infor-
mation, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1766-77 (2007) [hereinafter Smith, Intellectual Property].
17. See Christopher M. Newman, Patent Infringement as Nuisance, 59 CATH. U. L.
REV. 61 (2009) [hereinafter Newman, Patent Infringement].
18. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *404-07.
19. Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 321 (1871).
20. See infra Section I.A.
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weighs in favor of liability-rule protection of an infringed patent but would
not be a threshold requirement.21 If the court denied an injunction, it would
then direct the infringer and the pioneer patentee22 to negotiate an ongoing
royalty.23 If the parties failed to do so, the court would determine a royalty
itself and compel the infringer to compensate the patentee accordingly.
2 4
This proposal addresses several limitations in patent law's treatment of
technological improvement. In general, a patentee enjoys exclusive rights
over any technology that infringes her claims, even if that technology sub-
stantially improves on her original creation.25 For certain improvements,
patent law relies on "blocking patents" held by the pioneer and improver to
motivate voluntary licensing, thus allowing one or both parties to practice
the improved technology. However, as suggested above, transaction costs
and strategic behavior may prevent such agreements from arising.26 Addi-
tionally, while in theory the "reverse doctrine of equivalents" eliminates
infringement liability for those who radically improve on patented inven-
tions, courts rarely invoke it.27 The current proposal mitigates the strict right
to exclude normally enjoyed by patentees, thereby ameliorating the difficul-
ties of negotiations under the blocking patents regime and offering a viable
alternative to the reverse doctrine of equivalents.
While this proposal may seem radical at first glance, in many ways this
notion of weighing relative technological contributions by multiple parties is
already evident in eBay itself as well as several cases applying it. 28 The ac-
cession insight thus does not deviate markedly from existing precedent, but
arises organically from within it.
21. Indeed, the particularities of patent law as well as the availability of other mecha-
nisms to discipline strategic assertions of accession counsel against adopting a strict mental
state requirement. See infra Section IV. A. 1.
22. In this Article, I use the term "pioneer" in the context of a simple dynamic system
where an original, or pioneer, inventor patents some technology that a subsequent party then
improves. I do not confine my use of this term to the historical "pioneer patents" doctrine
whereby patents covering groundbreaking inventions receive broad judicial construction. See
Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New
Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 2002-03 (2005).
23. As this Article explains more fully below, conversion of patent protection from a
property rule to a liability rule does not displace private negotiations over royalty payments; it
merely changes the baseline conditions against which such negotiations take place. See Daniel
A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEx. L. REV. 253, 258 (2009) [hereinafter Crane, Intellec-
tual Liability]; infra Sections IV.A.3, V.A.2.
24. While this analysis focuses on the appropriateness of injunctive relief, it necessarily
intersects with recent doctrine clarifying the determination of patent infringement damages.
See infra Section V.B.2.
25. One exception to this general rule is the reverse doctrine of equivalents. See infra
notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
26. Additionally, the agreement may allow the initial patentee to obtain an undue pro-
portion of the rents arising from the improvement, thus diminishing incentives to improve.
27. See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
28. See infra Section IV.B.
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Part I surveys patent law's treatment of technological improvement and
explores how a substantial improvement to a patented technology may none-
theless infringe the underlying patent. To begin to develop a new approach
to technological improvement, Part II turns to the intersection of patents
and property, and in particular to the flexible conception of property rights
arising from the Supreme Court's eBay decision. Part III examines the
physical property doctrine of accession, whereby an innocent improver's
value-enhancing contributions to someone else's property may result in
title shifting to the improver, contingent upon compensating the prior
owner for the value of the source materials. Part IV draws on accession
doctrine to propose enhancements to patent infringement remedies analysis.
Under this proposal, courts would extend liability-rule protection when an
infringer substantially improves on an underlying patented invention.
Among other considerations, Part IV argues that this seemingly radical pro-
posal is conceptually consistent with eBay and its progeny. Part V explores
the unique advantages of this proposal as well as responds to several promi-
nent objections relating to valuation difficulties and perverse incentives.
Finally, Part VI explores further implications of this proposal for patent law
and the intersection of patents and property.
I. PATENT LAW'S TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENT
The patent system seeks to promote technological progress by confer-
ring exclusive rights on new inventions.29 These exclusive rights can be
quite broad, which both enhances incentives to invent and provides patent-
ees with significant control over the subsequent development of a patented
technology. In granting such broad exclusive rights, however, the patent sys-
tem can significantly complicate attempts by other parties to improve on
existing patented inventions.3" These complications are particularly prob-
lematic given that much innovation is cumulative in nature.3 Paradoxically,
29. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
30. Of course, in so doing, the patent system encourages parties to engage in one type
of "improvement": designing around existing patented inventions. See State Indus., Inc. v.
A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
31. See Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675/6), in I THE CORRE-
SPONDENCE OF ISAAC NEWTON, 1661-1675, at 416, 416 (H.W. Tumbull ed., 1959) ("If I have
seen further it is by standing on [th]e sho[u]lders of Giants."); Mark A. Lemley, The Econom-
ics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEx. L. REV. 989, 997 (1997) [hereinafter
Lemley, Economics of Improvement]; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 908 (1990); Suzanne Scotchmer, Stand-
ing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. EcoN. PERSP.
29, 30-31 (1991). But see THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d
ed. 1996) (presenting a theory of disjunctive scientific advance characterized by radical "para-
digm shifts"); Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical Science,
114 YALE L.J. 659 (2004) (showing how patent-induced blockage may facilitate paradigm
shifts).
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by providing strong incentives to invent, the patent system may chill incen-
tives to improve on existing inventions.
3 2
To understand the broad control that patents confer over technological
improvements, one must understand the nature of patent claiming.33 All pa-
tents conclude with one or more claims, which are highly stylized sentences
"particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which
the applicant regards as his invention." 34 The scope of patent rights-and
whether an accused product infringes those rights-depends on these
claims, 35 which may be much broader than any physical embodiment that
the patentee actually created. 36 As Robert Merges observes, "In practice,
clever lawyering can often produce a patent claim that covers more techno-
logical ground than is truly warranted by the underlying invention."37
To use a fanciful example, the original inventor of the chair could plau-
sibly claim "a flat sitting surface held parallel to the ground at a height
conducive to sitting by at least three support structures. '38 Even if this inven-
tor had simply attached three wooden legs to a wooden seat, she would have
exclusive rights over a wide variety of chairs of different shapes, materials,
and designs. Of course, the requirements of patent disclosure, particularly
that a patent adequately describe an invention39 and enable a technical arti-
32. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEx. L. REV. 505,
517 (2010) [hereinafter Golden, Remedies]. Commentators have recognized an analogous
dynamic in copyright law. See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Prop-
erty and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 157 (2002) ("[A]n overbroad grant of
monopoly rights to prior creators may retard the development of new intellectual products.");
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325, 332-44 (1989) (arguing that intellectual property ights raise costs for
subsequent creators).
33. Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 31, at 1000 ("The key to under-
standing the treatment of improvements in patent law is recognizing that patents are legally
defined by the language of the patent's claims, not by what the patent owner has actually in-
vented or built.").
34. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, sec. 4, § 118 (2011).
35. See In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that patent
claims define the "metes and bounds" of an invention).
36. See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Ena-
blement, 23 BERKELEY TaCH. L.J. 1141, 1169 (2008) ("[P]atent claims define the scope of the
inventor's rights by reciting properties; all things having those properties fall within the scope
of a patent's claims.").
37. Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent
Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1603 (2009) [hereinafter Merges, The Trouble
with Trolls].
38. Of course, this claim could be written in an infinite number of ways. For an addi-
tional example, see Lefstin, supra note 36, at 1169.
39. See, e.g., Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (reaffirming the written description requirement as a distinct criterion of patentability
independent of enablement).
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san to make and use it,40 constrain the scope of exclusive rights.4' Neverthe-
less, the scope of a claim commonly ranges well beyond the physical
embodiments (if any) created by the inventor. Thus, many "improvements"
to this original chair-such as using metal instead of wood, attaching four
legs instead of three, or creating a chair with a back and armrests-could
conceivably infringe the original patent.
In this fashion, a pioneer patentee's right to exclude may extend to prod-
ucts and processes that "improve" on an original invention but still infringe
one or more patent claims.42 One widely cited case demonstrating this phe-
nomenon involves satellite technology. In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
States, Hughes had patented a system by which a satellite sent data to Earth
for calculations and received outputs that helped orient the satellite in
space. 43 Another party developed a more advanced system in which the sat-
ellite could perform several of these functions onboard. 44 Although the
second invention represented an "improvement" over the original patent, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that it infringed the original
patent under the doctrine of equivalents.45 Thus Hughes, relying on its pa-
tent, had a right to exclude the infringer from practicing its improved
technology. As this example suggests, by conferring broad exclusive rights
to pioneers, patent law may impose significant costs on parties who improve
on existing inventions.46
40. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (describing a set of factors
used to determine whether a patent requires "undue experimentation" to practice, thus failing
the enablement requirement).
41. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 31, at 845-52 (exploring the role of the disclo-
sure requirements in calibrating patent scope).
42. Patent law recognizes two types of infringement: (1) literal infringement, in which
the accused product or process falls within the literal text of a patent claim; and (2) infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents, which "casts around a claim a penumbra which also
must be avoided...." Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 400 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
For present purposes, the distinction between literal infringement and infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents is largely irrelevant. However, one could argue that applying accession
doctrine to limit injunctive relief is even more appropriate when an improver has not literally
infringed a patent. For specific proposals to utilize liability rules in the context of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law's
Possession Paradox, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 46-48 (2009) and Smith, Intellectual Property,
supra note 16, at 1818-19.
43. 717 F.2d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
44. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1354.
45. Id. at 1366. As this case illustrates, the doctrine of equivalents can substantially
expand the effective scope of a patent claim. Here, the accused device incorporated technolog-
ical developments from outside of the original field of invention (and unforeseeable to the
patentee), but it nonetheless infringed the underlying patent. Holbrook, supra note 42, at 38.
46. For this and other reasons, Robert Merges and Richard Nelson argue in favor of
narrow patents in fields marked by cumulative innovation. Merges & Nelson, supra note 31, at
876-77. As discussed below, however, even narrow patents can read on a wide range of possi-
ble improvements, including those that operate in a radically different manner than the
original patented invention. See infra Section I.A. While acknowledging the problem of patent
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Before proceeding, it is important to clarify the way in which this Arti-
cle uses the term "improvement." Although technological improvement
represents one instantiation of cumulative innovation, this Article does not
equate "improvement" with that broader term. Cumulative innovation may
also encompass using one or more patented inventions as inputs into pro-
ducing other inventions, such as when a scientist uses several patented gene
fragments in research leading to a new biotechnology product.47 Cumulative
innovation may also entail finding a new use for an existing patented inven-
tion, such as when an individual discovers that a patented leather tanning
agent also treats AIDS . 8 While both of these practices involve cumulative
technological advances, they do not constitute "improvements" as this Arti-
cle uses the term. 4
9
For present purposes, "improving " a patented invention entails creating
a technology that serves a similar technical objective as the existing inven-
tion, but does so with greater efficiency or enhanced functionality. This
Article focuses on a particular subset of technologies that both improve on
some patented invention and infringe the underlying patent. One typical pat-
tern for such improvement arises when a pioneer inventor patents some
broad technological "genus" that is then infringed by a subsequent, im-
proved "species" falling within that genus.50 In this sense, the subsequent
party "designs over" an existing patented invention instead of "designing
around" it. As should be clear, improvement does not necessarily entail con-
sciously modifying some known, patented invention. A subsequent party
breadth, this Article directly addresses patent strength by arguing for liability-rule protection
of patents that are infringed by substantially improved technologies.
47. This type of cumulative innovation, and the role of patents in inhibiting it, has
spurred voluminous academic commentary on the so-called tragedy of the anticommons. See
generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESEARCH
TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY (1997); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 ScI. 698 (1998)
(discussing a "biomedical anticommons"); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticom-
mons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REV. 621 (1998)
(showing that overlapping property rights may lead to underutilization of resources). But see
JOHN P. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS TO RESEARCH INPUTS IN
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 2 (Final Report to the Nat'l Acad. of Sci. Comm. Intellectual Prop.
Rights in Genomic and Protein-Related Inventions, 2005) (finding little empirical support for
the anticommons theory in biomedical research). Along similar lines, scholars have devoted
considerable attention to potential blockages that arise when a single integrated product, such
as a semiconductor, incorporates many different patented components. See, e.g., Mark A.
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Thx. L. REV. 1991 (2007).
48. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 233 (5th ed. 2011) (citing Rohm & Haas Co. v. Roberts
Chem. Co., 245 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1957)).
49. Cf. Kevin Emerson Collins, Getting into the "Spirit" of Innovative Things: Looking
to Complementary and Substitute Properties to Shape Patent Protection for Improvements
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (distinguishing improve-
ment from other forms of cumulative innovation).
50. Cf. Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2659-60 (1994) [hereinafter Merges, Property Rules].
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may create a technological "improvement" of a prior patented invention
without even being aware of that prior invention's existence.
A. The Framework in Theory
Mark Lemley offers a useful three-part structure for understanding pa-
tent law's treatment of technological improvements that this Article also
adopts.5' First, "minor" improvements to a patented invention-notably im-
provements that do not satisfy the criteria for independent patentability-are
largely dominated by the original patent.52 If the improvement infringes the
patent, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, the pioneer pa-
tentee may bring suit, seeking an injunction and/or damages. Given that the
improvement is not patented, the original patentee can freely practice it. In
this sense, the original patentee essentially captures the value of the improv-
er's efforts.53
Second, the dynamic becomes more interesting in the case of "signifi-
cant" improvements that are independently patentable over the original
patented invention.14 Suppose, for example, that a pioneer inventor patented
the original design of a manual toothbrush. Now, suppose a subsequent in-
ventor develops an electric toothbrush-a significant improvement that fully
incorporates the earlier patented invention.55 According to longstanding pa-
tent doctrine, the improver could patent her improved technology (assuming
that it satisfied the statutory requirements of patentability) even though prac-
ticing it would constitute infringement of the earlier patent. This scenario
reflects the familiar situation of "blocking patents." Generally, the pioneer
patentee may prevent an improver from practicing any technology that en-
compasses the original patent (including the improvement), and the
improver can prevent the original patentee from practicing the improvement.
While overlapping exclusive rights seem like a perfect recipe for gridlock,
they also encourage parties to negotiate a licensing agreement whereby one
or both of the parties may practice the improved invention.
Third, under historical patent doctrine, "radical" improvements may
completely avoid liability even though they literally infringe a patent.5 6 Un-
der the so-called reverse doctrine of equivalents, an accused product may
escape infringement liability if it is "so far changed in principle from a
51. Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 31, at 1007-13.
52. Id. at 1007-08.
53. Id. at 1008.
54. Id. at 1008-10.
55. The wording of the Patent Act clearly suggests that improvements to patented in-
ventions may be independently patented. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title." (emphasis added)).
56. Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 31, at 1010-13. See generally Rob-
ert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking
Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994) [hereinafter Merges, Blocking Patents].
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patented article that it performs the same or a similar function in a substan-
tially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the
claim."57 In effect, the doctrine applies equitable principles to excuse radical
improvements from infringement liability.58
For example, in Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, Westing-
house accused Boyden of infringing its patent on an improved train brake.59
Westinghouse's patented brake used both a central air reservoir as well as
auxiliary air reservoirs in each train car to generate force for the brake cyl-
inders, and it used a "triple valve" to coordinate air flow and pressure in
each brake.6' Notably, Westinghouse's brake also featured a separate "auxil-
iary valve" that could simultaneously direct air from both the central and
auxiliary reservoirs to the brake cylinders in case of emergency.61 Boyden's
allegedly infringing brake contained similar elements, including a triple
valve. However, Boyden's ingenious triple valve incorporated within it a
valve that allowed air from both the central and auxiliary air reservoirs into
a brake cylinder in case of emergency.62 Arguably, this element paralleled
the separate "auxiliary valve" of Westinghouse's brake, thus rendering
Boyden's brake a literal infringement of Westinghouse's patent. However,
noting the "manifest departure from the principle of the Westinghouse pa-
tent,"63 the Supreme Court denied liability under what is now understood as
the reverse doctrine of equivalents. Even though Boyden's improvement
technically fell within Westinghouse's claims, Boyden's radically improved
design avoided infringement. 64 As a general matter, commentators have
lauded the reverse doctrine of equivalents as maintaining incentives for in-
ventors to improve radically on existing patented technologies. 65
57. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950); see
also SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1122-25 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(discussing the reverse doctrine of equivalents).
58. Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note 56, at 91.
59. 170 U.S. 537 (1898).
60. Boyden, 170 U.S. at 538.
61. Id. at541.
62. Id. at 564-65.
63. Id. at 572.
64. Cf Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment that a protein produced from
recombinant DNA technology infringed a patent on the same protein obtained from purifying
human blood).
65. See, e.g., Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 31, at 1012-13; Merges,
Blocking Patents, supra note 56.
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B. The Framework in Practice
While commentators have praised this tripartite system for addressing
technological improvement,66 practice does not always parallel theory. In
cases of "significant" improvement, blocking patents encourage pioneer and
subsequent patentees to negotiate a license. However, licensing transactions
are fraught with difficulties. Challenges to licensing include the following:
identifying pioneer patentees and improvers; high transaction costs; uncer-
tainty regarding the scope and value of patents; the inability of contracting
parties to capture positive externalities, which reduces incentives to license;
and noneconomic motivations, such as spite and "bad blood. 67 While sever-
al of these factors complicate licensing in general, they are intensified in
negotiations between technological pioneers and improvers. For example,
valuing the contributions of two different parties to an improved technology
is highly difficult, and uncertainty over future technological developments
can complicate negotiations.68
Additionally, economic theory suggests that strategic bargaining will
sometimes cause negotiations to fail even in the presence of a potential co-
operative surplus. 69 These considerations especially apply to bilateral
monopolies in which there is only one seller and one buyer of a resource,
which is often the case in patent licensing. 70 While much academic com-
mentary has focused on the implications of patent "holdup" for integrated
products composed of many patented components, holdup may also apply to
66. See Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 31, at 1073-74 (suggesting that
copyright law should adopt "blocking copyrights" and "radical improvers" doctrines modeled
on analogous concepts in patent law).
67. Id. at 1048-61; see also Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note 56, at 89-91.
68. Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note 56, at 75.
69. See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Property Rights Doctrine and Demand Revelation under
Incomplete Information, in ECONOMICS AND HUMAN WELFARE 23 (M. Boskin ed., 1979),
reprinted in 4 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW 216, 222-24 (1983); Robert Cooter
& Steven Marks, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behav-
ior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 243 (1982); Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of
"Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM. EcON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 356 (1980), re-
printed in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 139 (Victor P. Goldberg ed.,
1989); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 279, 298-300 (1978). Commentators have varied
somewhat in delineating the particular costs that fall within the rubric of "transaction costs."
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2184 (1997)
(distinguishing Type I transaction costs, which relate to assembling large or indefinite groups
of parties, from Type II transaction costs, which encompass the actual costs of bargaining,
including strategic behavior). For purposes of emphasis, this Article will generally refer sepa-
rately to transaction costs and strategic behavior, acknowledging full well that the latter may
be regarded as a subset of the former.
70. See Merges, Property Rules, supra note 50, at 2659 (describing blocking patents as
"a textbook case of bilateral monopoly in action"); see also James E. Krier & Stewart J.
Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L.




licensing negotiations for single-component products.71 As Robert Merges
and Richard Nelson tellingly describe, "The owner of an improvement that
contributes a very significant part of the value of the 'original patent plus
improvement' combination-i.e., an improvement that represents a major
technical advance-is thus subject to 'holdup' by the original patent hold-
er.,
72
To be sure, Lemley argues that blocking patents ameliorate these con-
cerns, "not by reducing transaction costs or uncertainty, but by increasing
the value to both parties of coming to an agreement. '73 Ultimately, however,
because of lingering transactional and strategic difficulties, bargaining be-
tween pioneers and improvers "will occasionally break down even though
they could both realize substantial gains from agreement." 74 Empirical ac-
counts of the early radio and steel industries confirm that negotiations
between pioneers and improvers sometimes fail and suggest that these fail-
ures can cause high social welfare losses.
75
In addition, it is important to consider not only whether parties agree to
a license but the particular division of rents arising from their agreement. If
an original patentee leverages her right to exclude to extract a disproportion-
ate share of rents, then even though a licensing agreement is achieved, an
improving patentee might face excessively diminished incentives to invent.
Ultimately, such chilled incentives may discourage future efforts to improve
on existing patented inventions.
Turning to "radical" improvements, courts rarely invoke the reverse doc-
trine of equivalents. In theory, the doctrine "serves as a judicial 'safety
valve"' that can ameliorate instances of bargaining breakdown between pio-
neers and improvers.7 6 However, the Federal Circuit has effectively
abrogated the doctrine.77 In 2002, it stated as follows:
Not once has this court affirmed a decision finding noninfringement based
on the reverse doctrine of equivalents. And with good reason: when Con-
gress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 112, after the decision in Graver Tank, it
imposed requirements for the written description, enablement, definiteness,
71. See, e.g., Thomas F Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Re-
sponses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151 (2009); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 47; Carl Shapiro,
Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 280 (2010).
72. Merges & Nelson, supra note 31, at 865 n.l 15.
73. Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 31, at 1069.
74. Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note 56, at 75.
75. Id. at 84-89.
76. Id. at 75. While Robert Merges advocates excusing some holders of subservient
blocking patents from infringement liability, most notably via the reverse doctrine of equiva-
lents, I propose a more graduated approach in which such parties would face liability-rule
protection of the patents they infringe. See id. at 75-76; Merges, Property Rules, supra note
50, at 2660.
77. Merges & Nelson, supra note 31, at 887.
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and means-plus-function claims that are co-extensive with the broadest
possible reach of the reverse doctrine of equivalents."S
According to the Federal Circuit, the disclosure and claiming requirements
of patent law constrain claim scope such that radical improvements are like-
ly to avoid infringement liability, thus rendering the reverse doctrine of
equivalents somewhat superfluous. However, given the vagueness of claims
and the breadth with which courts often interpret them, 79 it seems doubtful
that these "constraints" provide the same safeguard as the reverse doctrine
of equivalents. In any event, as an empirical matter the doctrine is "seldom-
used" and largely moribund.80
In sum, the patent system often operates in practice to favor original pa-
tentees considerably over subsequent improvers. "Minor" improvements are
dominated by prior patents. "Significant" improvers, although wielding the
leverage of their own patents, face difficult negotiations with pioneer patent-
ees. And "radical" improvers may rarely avail themselves of the reverse
doctrine of equivalents to escape infringement liability. In many ways, im-
provers are still subject to the exclusive rights of pioneer patentees, thus
dampening incentives to improve. To further shore up these incentives, and
to provide a more equitable approach to technological improvement, this
Article turns to doctrines from traditional property law.
II. PATENTS AS PROPERTY
A. Exclusive Rights over Productive Resources
As illustrated in the previous survey of technological improvement, the
patent system generally confers strong exclusive rights over inventions. Pio-
neer patentees dominate minor improvers, and such patentees also enjoy a
high degree of leverage over significant improvers in blocking patents sce-
narios. The reverse doctrine of equivalents is the exception that proves the
rule; courts apply this limitation on a patentee's strict right to exclude ex-
tremely rarely.
78. Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
79. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking
Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1743 (2009) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Fence
Posts] (examining the failure of patent claims to provide clear notice of their boundaries); Kevin
Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising Technology: On Thing
Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REv. 493 (2008) (exploring the phe-
nomenon by which patent claims are not limited to an inventor's actual creations, particularly in
the case of after-arising technologies).
80. Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note 56, at 91; see also Roche Palo Alto LLC v.
Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("The reverse doctrine of equivalents is
rarely applied, and this court has never affirmed a finding of non-infringement under the re-
verse doctrine of equivalents."); Ethyl Molded Prods. Co. v. Betts Package Inc., CIV. A. No.
85-111, 1988 WL 122168, at *36 (E.D. Ky. 1988) ("The reverse doctrine of equivalents, alt-
hough frequently argued by infringers, has never been applied by the Federal Circuit.").
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In embracing strong exclusive rights, patent law clearly parallels the law
of physical property. Property, after all, has long been associated with the
right to exclude. 81 This Article further explores the similarities of patents
and physical property, but in a manner that leads to some rather unexpected
results. In so doing, it must proceed cautiously, for patent law has a compli-
cated relationship with property. On the one hand, patents and property
share certain unmistakable similarities in both ends and means. In terms of
objectives, patent law's goal of promoting technological progress parallels
one of the most important objectives of property rights: to encourage pro-
ductive exploitation of resources.82 In terms of mechanisms, patent law
parallels traditional formulations of property rights by conferring broad ex-
clusive rights over such resources.8 3 Exclusive rights serve a number of
functions in both contexts, including facilitating the internalization of exter-
nalities' and economizing on information costs when delineating acceptable
uses of assets.85
Along these lines, numerous authorities have long compared patents to
physical property. This comparison is unsurprising given that the Patent Act
itself states that "patents shall have the attributes of personal property."
86
The Supreme Court has noted that "[p]atents ... have long been considered
a species of property"8 7 and has described patent rights as encompassing
"the legitimate expectations of inventors in their property."88 Furthermore,
81. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 673 (1999) ("The hallmark of a protected property interest is a right to exclude others.");
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (noting that the right to exclude is
"one the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as prop-
erty"); 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *2 (describing property ownership as "that
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things in the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe"); Richard Epstein,
Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v. Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21,
22 (1997) ("[It is difficult to conceive of any property as private if the right to exclude is
rejected."); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730
(1998) ("[T]he fight to exclude others is more than just 'one of the most essential constituents'
of property-it is the sine qua non." (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176)).
82. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347 (1967). This productive impulse is reflected, for example, in the doctrine of first posses-
sion. See, e.g., CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 20 (1994). This is not, of course,
the only purpose that property rights serve. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 50-52
(7th ed. 2010) (listing other objectives of property law).
83. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States
any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.").
84. Demsetz, supra note 82, at 349; Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1755 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Property and Property Rules].
85. Smith, Intellectual Property, supra note 16, at 1745-46.
86. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006).
87. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
642 (1999).
88. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002);
accord eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006); Panduit Corp. v.
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academic commentary is replete with comparisons of patents to physical
property.8 9
In most contexts, this conception of patents as property bolsters norma-
tive claims that patents should confer strict exclusive rights.9° Just as
trespass grants landowners a strong right to exclude unauthorized visitors, 91
patents should enable inventors to enjoin all unauthorized uses of a patented
technology. According to this view, strict exclusive rights provide the best
mechanism for encouraging invention and commercialization, 92 facilitating
technology transactions, 93 and minimizing the information costs of using
technologies.94
On the other hand, scholars have questioned the patents-as-property
analogy by highlighting the fundamentally different natures of patented in-
ventions and physical property. The technical information protected by
patents is a public good, meaning that it is nonriva 95 (multiple parties can
use it without diminishing its availability) and nonexcludable96 (absent legal
Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 n.5 (6th Cir. 1978) ("Patents must by law be
given 'the attributes of personal property.' The right to exclude others is the essence of the
human right called 'property.'" (citations omitted) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 261)). Historically,
some courts have even extended the Takings Clause to government deprivations of patent
rights. Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection
of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 690 (2007) ("Patents are proper-
ty."). But see Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
(refusing to apply the Takings Clause to government deprivations of patents).
89. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 33 (2008) (arguing that patents share
key attributes of "tangible property"); Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Patents Are Property: A
Fundamental But Important Concept, 4 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 87 (2009); Nestor M. Davidson,
Standardization and Plurality in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1658-59 (2008) (dis-
cussing intellectual property as property); Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still
Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 108, 109 (1990); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and
Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 703 (2001); Mark A.
Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1031, 1035 n.8
(2005) [hereinafter Lemley, Free Riding] (collecting additional sources).
90. E.g., Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 89, at 1031-32 (describing but not endorsing
this argument); Mark A. Lemley & Phillip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Gov-
ern Information?, 85 TEx. L. REV. 783, 783-84 (2007) (same).
91. Tellingly, even here property law admits some exceptions. See infra note 110 and
accompanying text.
92. E.g., Kieff, supra note 89, at 733 (noting the importance of strict exclusive rights in
commercializing technology).
93. Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1477, 1519 (2005).
94. See Smith, Intellectual Property, supra note 16, at 1744-45, 1804-06.
95. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac M'Pherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180-81 (H.A. Washington ed., N.Y.C., Derby & Jackson
1859) (describing ideas as "expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any
point").
96. While firms may protect valuable information as trade secrets, without legal inter-
vention such as enforceable nondisclosure agreements, it may be difficult for firms to maintain
the secrecy of information yet still exploit it.
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intervention, it is difficult if not impossible to exclude others from appropri-
ating it).97 These attributes distinguish intellectual property from physical
property such as land and chattels, which are both rivalrous and more easily
excludable.98 As such, traditional justifications for private property rights, such
as to avoid a tragedy of the commons, 99 are inapposite to intellectual property,
which by its nature is not subject to overconsumption."° The theoretical foun-
dations for patents and property are thus quite distinct.10' Furthermore, natural
rights justifications for property law °2 do not apply with the same force to
patents, which (according to conventional understanding) exist not to reward
effort or genius but to promote society-wide technological progress. 03 Com-
mentators also observe that the term "intellectual property" is of relatively
recent vintage and that this linguistic similarity may imply more conceptual
similarity than is warranted.tI'
These distinctions between patents and property, moreover, motivate
calls to limit the breadth and strength of patent rights. Viewed through an
economic lens, the nonrival nature of technical designs means that an infi-
nite number of people can simultaneously "consume" them without
producing scarcity. Static allocative efficiency thus weighs in favor of open
97. But see Robin Cowan et al., The Explicit Economics of Knowledge Codification and
Tacitness, 9 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 211, 224 (2000) (noting the importance of tacit
knowledge in practicing patented inventions and challenging the conception of knowledge as
nonrival and nonexcludable).
98. Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 89, at 1050-53.
99. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1245 (1968); see
Demsetz, supra note 82, at 348-49 (framing this argument in terms of internalizing externali-
ties).
100. Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 89, at 1053; see also Mossoff, supra note 88, at
719-21 (noting the challenge of applying the Takings Clause to patent law, given that govern-
ment use of a patented invention does not physically dispossess the inventor of anything). But
see ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
1035 (5th ed. 2010) (noting "congestion externalities" that undermine the value of intangible
resources-such as a celebrity's image-even though the underlying resource remains non-
rival).
101. Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 89, at 1055 ("Intellectual property ... is not a
response to allocative distortions resulting from scarcity, as real property is. Rather, it is a
conscious decision to create scarcity in a type of good which is ordinarily absent in order to
artificially boost the economic returns to innovation." (emphasis omitted)).
102. See generally JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson
ed., Hackett Publ'g 1980) (1690).
103. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)
("[The] ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the
public domain through disclosure."); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158
(1948) ("The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary
consideration."); Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945)
("The primary purpose of our patent system is not reward of the individual but the advance-
ment of the arts and sciences."); Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83
WASH. L. REV. 39, 52 (2008) [hereinafter Lee, Intellectual Infrastructure].
104. See Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 89, at 1033 n.4; cf. Lemley & Weiser, supra




access to existing inventions, a regime that cuts directly against exclusive
rights. 05 While physical property law utilizes exclusive rights to internalize
externalities, 10 6 commentators note that full internalization of externalities
would be highly deleterious in the intellectual property context.01 Indeed,
positive externalities are crucial to the design of intellectual property re-
gimes, which allow and encourage many forms of free riding. 18
This Article does not attempt to resolve the question of whether patents
are property. Rather than accept or reject the patents-as-property analogy
wholesale, this Article takes a more granular approach. It contends that in
certain contexts, property doctrine and theory may be helpful in understand-
ing, tailoring, and improving certain aspects of patent law. Continuing with
the theme of granularity, this Article also challenges the implicit presump-
tion that physical property law categorically favors strict exclusive rights. At
a descriptive level, "[lt]he very notion of property as exclusive dominion is at
most a cartoon or trope." In various contexts, property law limits an own-
er's right to exclude to serve interests of efficiency, fairness, and public
welfare.I"0 At a normative level, the ways in which property law confers less
than strict exclusive rights may suggest curtailing patent rights as well."'
Before introducing a specific proposal applying these insights, this Article
turns to a recent Supreme Court case that sheds additional light on the na-
ture of property rights conferred by patents.
105. Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 917,
929.
106. See Demsetz, supra note 82.
107. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
257 (2007); Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 89.
108. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 107.
109. Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J.
601, 631 (1998). For additional descriptive and normative critiques of the association of prop-
erty with strict exclusive rights, see PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 201
(C.B. MacPherson ed., 1978); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in Ameri-
can Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 734 (2009); Morris R. Cohen, Property and
Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12, 21, 26 (1927).
110. See, e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221, 221-22 (Minn. 1910)
(suggesting owner of dock had no right to force barge to leave during storm, but holding own-
er of barge liable for damage to dock); State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (recognizing
limitations on the right to exclude in the context of shared possession); Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A.
188 (Vt. 1908) (holding that necessity may justify unauthorized entry onto land). For general
summaries, see Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV.
611, 674-77 (1988); Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 84, at 1734-35. Even
Richard Epstein, a proponent of strong property rights, recognizes appropriate limitations on
the right to exclude where "bilateral monopoly, holdout problems, and transaction-cost obsta-
cles" arise. See Richard A. Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 2, 7
(1990).
111. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property through a Property Para-
digm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004); see also Christopher M. Newman, Transformation in Property




B. eBay v. MercExchange
An important Supreme Court case dealing with patent infringement
remedies has further complicated the relationship between patents and prop-
erty. In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., eBay and Half.com, a wholly
owned subsidiary of eBay, infringed MercExchange's business method pa-
tent on an electronic market." 2 However, the district court denied
MercExchange's motion for permanent injunctive relief." 3 The Federal Cir-
cuit reversed, applying its "'general rule that courts will issue permanent
injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstanc-
es.' ' '11 4 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit. The
Court first affirmed a conception of patents as property but then clarified
that "the creation of a [property] right is distinct from the provision of rem-
edies for violations of that right."" 5  Thus, the Court implicitly
acknowledged that protecting a property right did not necessarily require a
property rule, which is characterized by injunctive relief. 16
The Court thus rejected a per se rule favoring injunctions in infringe-
ment actions and established a multifactor equitable framework for
determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief.' The Court described
this framework as follows:
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inade-
quate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is war-
ranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction. 8
eBay has significant implications for the relationship between patents
and property. It also has significant implications for infringement remedies
in the context of technological improvement. Courts are no longer shackled
112. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698-99 (E.D. Va. 2003),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated sub nom. eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
113. ld.at715.
114. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (quoting Mer-
cExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339).
115. ld. at 392.
116. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 12, at 1092-93, 1105-06; see also Voda v.
Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006)
("[T]he Court clearly held the right to exclude does not, standing alone, justify a general rule
in favor of injunctive relief.").
117. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. In adopting a holistic framework, the Court thus reinvigorat-
ed the equitable nature of patent injunctions analysis. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006) ("The
several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance
with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such
terms as the court deems reasonable."); Wendy R. Stein, The Supreme Court eBay Decision:
Eliminating Special Rules in Patent Cases, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Oct. 2006, at 18.
118. eBay, 547U.S. at391.
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to a syllogism wherein a finding of infringement leads inexorably to the
grant of an injunction, thus raising the possibility of continued infringement
even after a finding of liability. Denying injunctive relief also raises the pos-
sibility of providing ongoing royalties to a patentee as compensation for
prospective infringement, thus converting patent protection from a property
rule to a liability rule. 119 In order to apply this newfound flexibility to en-
hance patent law's treatment of technological improvement, this Article first
turns to the physical property principle of accession.
HI. AcCESSION
A. Accession Generally
In general, the principle of accession refers to the granting of title to some
resource based on its relationship to something that is already owned.120 Ac-
cession, which enjoys a long history extending from Roman civil law,12 1
encompasses several distinct legal doctrines sharing this conceptual basis.
Under the doctrine of ratione soli, for example, landowners enjoy constructive
possession of wild animals that happen to be on their land.12 2 Similarly, the
"rule of increase" holds that the owner of a female domesticated animal also
owns whatever offspring that animal produces. 123 Likewise, under the doctrine
of accretion, a riparian landowner takes title to alluvial deposits that augment
her land. 24 Accession further explains why farmers own the crops that grow
on their soil, 125 property owners hold title to oil deposits beneath their surface
estates, 126 and fixtures generally belong to the owner of the land and im-
provements to which they are affixed. 27 In all of these cases, accession grants
title to property based on its relationship to something that is already owned.
This Article focuses on a subset of accession doctrines dealing with one
party's improvement of someone else's property. Here, again, distinctions are
in order. In the real property context, typical cases involve a trespasser who,
perhaps mistakenly, improves someone else's land by building a house on
it.' 28 This Article, however, focuses on a constellation of "mistaken improver"
119. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 12, at 1092-93.
120. See Merrill, supra note 16, at 460.
121. See Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 313 (1871); Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N.Y.
379, 388 (1850); Earl C. Arnold, The Law of Accession of Personal Property, 22 COLUM. L.
REV. 103 (1922); Merrill, supra note 16, at 463.
122. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 179-80 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1805) (discussing ratione
soli).
123. Merrill, supra note 16, at 464-65.
124. id. at 465-66; cf Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359 (1892) (holding that the law of
accretion controls when the river boundary between two states shifts).
125. Merrill, supra note 16, at 465.
126. Id. at 467.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Proctor v. Huntington, 192 P.3d 958 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). See generally
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531,
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doctrines dealing with personal property. Given the Patent Act's characteriza-
tion of patents as "personal property," 12 9 this focus seems particularly
appropriate.
Commentators routinely group several related but distinct concepts to-
gether when discussing mistaken improvers of personal property. 130 Such
grouping is all the more confusing because one of these concepts is known as
"accession." First, "specification" applies when someone exerts labor or skill
to create a new product out of the personal property of another, such as when
one person uses someone else's marble to carve a statue.'3 ' Second, "acces-
sion" or "adjunction" applies when two or more items of personal property
owned by different parties are joined but remain distinguishable.' This con-
cept is implicated, for example, when one individual's diamond is encased in
another individual's ring.'33 Finally, "confusion" applies when two similar
kinds of property (from different owners) are combined such that they cannot
be distinguished. 3 4 This occurs, for example, when wheat belonging to two
different owners becomes intermixed. In common parlance, the doctrine of
accession has come to be associated with both the concepts of "specification"
and "accession," which are distinct from "confusion."'13 5 While this Article
focuses most centrally on the concept of "specification," it refers to the broad-
er doctrine of accession consistent with modem usage.
In certain circumstances, the doctrine of accession can cause a curious
transfer of property rights. According to this doctrine, when an innocent party
improves someone else's personal property in a way that significantly enhanc-
es its value or changes its nature, the improver may take title to the improved
item, contingent upon compensating the original owner for the raw materi-
als.' 36 In explaining this application of accession, Blackstone noted:
599-600 (2005) (arguing for a unified theory of property predicated on creating and defending
the value inherent in stable ownership); Kelvin H. Dickinson, Mistaken Improvers of Real
Estate, 64 N.C. L. REV. 37 (1985) (discussing the history of statutory and judicial relief for
mistaken improvers of land owned by others); John Henry Merryman, Improving the Lot of
the Trespassing Improver, II STAN. L. REV. 456 (1959) (describing the treatment of trespass-
ing improvers in different bodies of law and suggesting reforms).
129. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006).
130. See generally Arnold, supra note 121 (distinguishing among specificatio, accessio,
and confusio).
131. Id. at 104-17.
132. Id. at 118.
133. 1 JOHN BOUVIER, INSTITUTES OF AMERICAN LAW 198 (Phila., Robert E. Peterson
1851).
134. Arnold, supra note 121, at 119-20.
135. Merrill, supra note 16, at 464 n.4; see also Newman, Patent Infringement, supra
note 17, at 87.
136. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *404-07; see Arnold, supra note 121, at
120 ("In the absence of a statutory modification of the common law action of replevin, the
plaintiff cannot recover his property in specie if its personal identity has been changed."); see,
e.g., B.A. Ballou & Co. v. Citytrust, 591 A.2d 126, 130 n.4 (Conn. 1991) ("If, however, the
identity of the item has been destroyed, its nature substantially changed, or value greatly en-
hanced, as between the manufacturer and the original owner, the owner loses his right of
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[I]f the thing itself, by such operation, was changed into a different species,
as by making wine, oil, or bread, out of another's grapes, olives, or wheat, it
belongs to the new operator; who has only to make a satisfaction to the for-
mer proprietor for the materials, which he had so converted.'37
The canonical case of Wetherbee v. Green, discussed above,'38 illustrates
the doctrine of accession. 3 9 Wetherbee, acting in good faith, 4 ' cut a stand of
trees and used the resulting lumber to fashion barrel hoops, thus increasing the
value of the wood more than twentyfold.1'1 The original property owners sued
for replevin of the hoops. After reciting the general rule that one whose prop-
erty has been misappropriated may recover it, 42 the Supreme Court of
Michigan identified an exception based on accession. 143 Where an individual
has transformed someone else's property, thus significantly enhancing its val-
ue, title shifts to the improver as long as he compensates the original owner
for the materials taken: 144
ownership and retains only an action for the value of the goods lost."); Capitol Chevrolet Co.
v. Earheart, 627 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) ("Where the appropriation of the
property was unintentional and labor or material have been expended or added which greatly
enhances its value, and the value of the original article is insignificant in comparison with the
value of the new product, the title to the property in its converted form will pass to the person
who has thus expended or added his labor and materials, compensating the owner for the value
of the original article or materials." (citing I C.J.S. Accession § 5 (1936))); Kirby Lumber Co.
v. Temple Lumber Co., 83 S.W.2d 638, 648 (Tex. 1935) ("It is a well-settled rule of decision
in other jurisdictions that when the appropriation of property is made in good faith under a
mistake of facts, and the taker has by labor expended upon said property converted it into a
thing entirely different from the original and of greatly increased value, the title to the proper-
ty will pass to the person by whose labor the change has been wrought, and the original owner
can only recover the value of the article at the time it was taken."); Ochoa v. Rogers, 234 S.W.
693, 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) ("But if the one in wrongful possession be an innocent or
unintentional trespasser, and in good faith improves and enhances the value of the property,
and such improvements and additions exceed, or even substantially approach, the value of the
article in its raw state when found, the property in dispute becomes merely accessory to the
resulting product, and title thereto passes to the purchaser, who is liable to the original owner
only for the market value of the lost article at the time it is found.").
137. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *404.
138. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
139. 22 Mich. 311 (1871).
140. The property at issue was originally owned by Sumner and Green as tenants in
common. Wetherbee obtained a license from Sumner, who had been authorized by Green to
grant licenses on behalf of both co-owners. However, before Sumner granted a license to
Wetherbee, Sumner had conveyed his interest to Camp and Brooks. Thus, at the time that
Sumner issued the license to Wetherbee, Sumner had no interest in the property. Wetherbee, 22
Mich. at 312-13.
141. Id. at313.
142. Id. at 314; accord Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N.Y. 379, 381-85 (1850); Arnold, supra
note 121, at 104.
143. Drawing in particular on the notion of specification, the court observed that there
must "be some limit to the [property owner's] right to follow and reclaim materials which




In a case of this kind, the change in the species of the chattel is not an inten-
tional wrong to the original owner. It is, therefore, regarded as destruction or
consumption of the original materials, and the true owner is not permitted to
trace the identity into the manufactured article, for the purposes of appropri-
ating to his own use the labor and skill of the innocent occupant who
wrought the change.
4 5
Extrapolating from these principles, Wetherbee could retain title to the im-
proved property contingent upon paying damages to the original owners for
the underlying wood.
To determine whether accession warrants shifting title from plaintiff to de-
fendant, courts focus on the degree to which a defendant has "transformed"
the property in question. 146 Courts have developed several approaches to eval-
uating transformation. First, courts applying "physical identity theory"
consider whether an improved article has "changed into another species.,'
1 47
Within this approach, "a permanent alteration of the component parts must
have been made, so that any attempt to change them again to their original
form would cause so much damage in proportion to the value as to make it
impracticable. '148 Notably, in some cases, this approach can transfer title from
an original owner to an improver even when the taking was willful. 149 Second,
many courts focus on the "comparative value" of the original and improved
items to determine whether the improvement has produced the requisite trans-
formation. 50 This approach is generally only available when the original
taking was not willful.' 51
Wetherbee is indicative of the comparative value approach,' 52 which sev-
eral modem courts have also adopted. 5 3 If the value of the improver's labor
"has swallowed up and rendered insignificant the value of the original mate-
rials," transformation has been achieved and title transfers to the improver. 154
145. Id. at 316.
146. Id. at 318 ("The important question ... appears to us to be, whether standing trees,
when cut and manufactured into hoops, are to be regarded as so far changed in character that
their identity can be said to be destroyed within the meaning of the authorities."); see also
Silsbury, 3 N.Y. at 385-87 (giving examples involving transformations of wheat to bread,
olives to oil, and grapes to wine). Of course, transformation is not the only factor that courts
consider. For example, several courts have held that no matter what the degree of physical
transformation, if a defendant has engaged in willful trespass, the original owner may recover
an improved article derived from his property. Arnold, supra note 121, at 107.
147. Id. at 105.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 108.
150. Id. at 106.
151. Id.
152. Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 320 (1871) ("When the right to the improved
article is the point in issue, the question, how much property or labor of each has contributed
to make it what it is, must always be of first importance.").
153. See, e.g., Capitol Chevrolet Co. v. Earheart, 627 S.W.2d 369, 371-72 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1982); Drake Ins. Co. v. King, 606 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1980); Ochoa v. Rogers, 234
S.W. 693, 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
154. Wetherbee, 22 Mich. at 320.
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Within this analysis, courts focus on the actual values of the improver's and
original owner's contributions to the improved item, not on the cost of their
respective contributions.' 55 Whichever party contributes the greater part of
the value takes title to the improved item.
Here it is important to clarify a potential point of confusion regarding
accession doctrine. As previously noted, the principle of accession grants
title to some asset based on its relationship to something else that is already
owned. In cases of mistaken improvement, this principle may suggest that
the original owner should retain title to the improved item. (After all, the
improved item is derived from resources that are already owned by that par-
ty.) However, the doctrine of accession shifts title to the improver in cases of
transformative or significant, value-enhancing improvement. While this doc-
trine appears to be an exception to the general accession principle, it is in
fact consistent with it. Abstracting somewhat, Thomas Merrill observes that
the central question in accession cases is "which owner of inputs has sup-
plied the larger or more valuable input-i.e., has established the most
prominent connection" to the improved item.' 56 The operative "input" in
cases of value-enhancing improvement is the labor of the improver. This
labor establishes a more "prominent connection" to the improved item, thus
trumping the other party's original ownership of the source material.'57 The
"mistaken improver" doctrine thus represents a coherent application of gen-
eral accession principles by allocating title to property based on its
relationship to something else that is owned-namely, the labor of the im-
prover.
Commentators have lauded accession on a number of fronts. Infor-
mation costs are critical to property,'58 and accession provides a low-cost,
intuitive method for allocating property rights in an improved item. 59 By
vesting title in the improver, the doctrine of accession thus encourages (or at
least does not unduly punish) productive exploitation of resources. However,
the doctrine guards against strategic behavior by generally insisting on good
faith by the mistaken improver. The doctrine of accession also appeals to
notions of fairness. There is, as commentators have pointed out, a distinctly
Lockean tenor to accession doctrine, which converts protection of a resource
from a property rule to a liability rule based on an innocent improver's sig-
nificant and value-enhancing contributions to some source material. 160 The
doctrine parallels Locke's notion that an improving laborer should receive
155. See, e.g., id. (concluding that "[n]o test which satisfies the reason of the law" can
ignore "the circumstance of relative values").
156. Merrill, supra note 16, at 466.
157. Id. at 481 n.16.
158. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) (discussing the
importance of information costs in delineating property rights in the context of the numerus
clausus principle).
159. Merrill, supra note 16, at 477-78.
160. See Smith, Intellectual Property, supra note 16, at 1766-77.
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title to property when the "labour makes the far greatest part of the value of
[the asset]."' 61 As we will see, these benefits-notably efficiency and fair-
ness-provide valuable guides for reforming the treatment of technological
improvement in patent law.
B. Accession and Intellectual Property
Before turning to the proposal at hand, it is worthwhile to note that
many areas of intellectual property law already exhibit accession-like fea-
tures. 162 Where accession arises in the intellectual property context, it
generally operates to expand the scope of exclusive rights for existing own-
ers of intellectual property assets. As noted below, however, this need not be
the case.
For example, one sees traces of accession in copyright law. This is most
apparent in copyright's provisions that award "derivative work" rights to an
initial author.163 Under standard copyright doctrine, an author who writes a
book about a boy wizard who attends wizard school obtains not only exclu-
sive rights in that written work, but also the right to prepare "derivative
works" such as sequels and movie adaptations 64 Here, ownership of some
resource (the derivative work) is allocated to the initial author based on the
work's relationship to something else that is already owned (the copyright in
the book).
Trademark law also reflects principles of accession, most notably in the
doctrine of dilution. Dilution gives the owner of a famous mark the right to
prohibit uses of the mark that may blur or tarnish it, even where consumer
confusion is unlikely. 165 For example, dilution would likely prohibit a firm
from calling its product "Rolls Royce Corndogs," even though few consum-
ers would be confused into thinking that the famous automaker produces
this snack food. Dilution reflects accession principles insofar as trademark
law confers "supplementary" property rights to an individual based on the
close relationship between those rights and a presently owned, famous
mark. 166
Commentators have also identified elements of accession in patent law.
Henry Smith draws an analogy between accession and the original grant of a
patent to an inventor.' 67 According to this view, technical ideas are collec-
161. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 265, 297 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (emphasis omitted).
162. See Merrill, supra note 16, at 468-69.
163. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (2006); Merrill, supra note 16, at 468.
164. Lemley, Economics ofimprovement, supra note 31, at 1018-20.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
166. Merrill, supra note 16, at 469. Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna challenge this
view, and the wider notion of expansive ownership of marks in unrelated markets, on norma-
tive grounds. Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV.
137, 177-80 (2010). Notably, Lemley and McKenna also criticize the application of physical
property concepts like accession to intellectual property. id.
167. Smith, intellectual Property, supra note 16, at 1766-82.
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tively owned in the public domain, and inventors add their ingenuity and
labor to these ideas to produce privately owned, patented inventions.'68 This
interaction parallels accession scenarios in which one party improves some-
one else's property. Under this formulation, the inventor receives title to the
"improvement" (the patented invention) in exchange for compensating the
public via technical disclosure.'69
Elements of accession are reflected not only in the initial grant of patent
rights but also in the broad control that patentees enjoy over subsequent
technological developments. Related to the cases of "minor" and "signifi-
cant" improvements described above, 7 ' Thomas Merrill sees accession at
play in allowing pioneer patentees to enjoy property rights over subsequent
technological advances.' In particular, minor improvements to a patented
invention that are not themselves independently patentable effectively be-
long to the pioneer inventor, as she can "block anyone else from using an
invention that incorporates the patent."'7 2 This view also relates to Edmund
Kitch's influential prospect theory, which justifies granting early, broad pa-
tents to inventors based on the notion that patentees may then rationally
coordinate subsequent developments of protected technologies.' 73 An even
more direct example of accession is the doctrine of equivalents, which effec-
tively enhances patent scope beyond what an inventor literally claims.'74
Here, again, patent law allocates ownership of additional resources based on
their relationship to something that is already owned-in this case an exist-
ing patented invention.
While accession generally serves to expand (or initiate) the rights of pa-
tentees, it may also limit those rights.'75 As a broad normative matter, Mark
Lemley and Mark McKenna challenge an expansive notion of accession on
the ground that it jeopardizes the public domain, a valuable "residuum"
where "ideas and creations remain unowned, free for all to use."'76 As a doc-
trinal matter, however, it is not always the case that accession favors the
168. Among other considerations, Smith distinguishes patent acquisition from first pos-
session, which presumes that the underlying technical ideas are unowned, by emphasizing that
society has preexisting rights in the public domain. Id. at 1767-68.
169. Id. at 1771.
170. See supra Part 1.
171. Merrill, supra note 16, at 468-69.
172. Id. at 469.
173. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 266 (1977).
174. Merrill, supra note 16, at 469; see Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d
391, 400 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
175. In a proposal similar to the one advanced below, Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex
Stein have suggested various mechanisms for limiting a copyright holder's right to exclude
based on the degree of originality of an infringing work. Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note
16. Notably, the authors draw support for their proposal from accession doctrine. Id. at 1527.
176. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 166, at 177-80. While Lemley and McKenna criti-
cize accession in the context of trademark law, id., their arguments are also applicable to other
branches of intellectual property, including patent law.
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interests of original resource owners. This is particularly relevant when two
inventors both have claims on some technology, such as when one party
improves on another's invention.
In an insightful article, Christopher Newman explores the possibility of
applying accession doctrine to limit injunctive relief when a substantial im-
prover infringes an underlying patent. 17 7 While he notes the viability of such
a proposal, concerns over valuation and pricing lead him to suggest cabining
its application to somewhat limited contexts. Among other considerations,
he argues that the thinness of licensing markets and concomitant valuation
difficulties preclude widespread application of accession doctrine to limit
injunctive relief. 17 8 Even where reliable valuations are feasible, the risk of
opportunistic behavior complicates potential applications of accession. 179
Along these lines, he argues that injunctive relief should be denied only
when an initial patentee has already nonexclusively licensed his patent or
where enhanced damages based on willful infringement are available to en-
courage negotiations between a pioneer patentee and an improver.180
While I share many of Newman's concerns, I offer a more optimistic ac-
count of applying accession to cases of infringing technological
improvement. In particular, this Article draws on recent developments in the
law of patent infringement remedies-including both injunctions and dam-
ages-to show that technical concerns are less vexing than first meets the
eye. Additionally, I frame my proposal for liability-rule protection of pio-
neer patents as an action-forcing mechanism that may actually encourage
more voluntary negotiations between improvers and pioneer patentees. Ac-
cordingly, I contend that accession offers a valuable guide for reforming the
law of technological improvement.
IV. APPLYING ACCESSION DOCTRINE TO PATENT
INFRINGEMENT REMEDIES
A. The Proposal
This Article proposes that courts apply accession analysis within the
eBay framework to deny injunctive relief in cases where an infringer "sub-
stantially" improves on an underlying patented invention. If a court applies
accession and denies an injunction,' 8' it would then direct the pioneer and
177. Newman, Patent Infringement, supra note 17. Newman largely focuses on the ca-
nonical case of "improvements" involving a multicomponent system that incorporates and
infringes some underlying patent. Id. at 67. This Article, however, focuses on situations ap-
proximating the reverse doctrine of equivalents, where a technology infringes an existing
patent but achieves a similar technical objective in a substantially improved manner.
178. Id. at 114-15.
179. Id. at 115-16.
180. Id. at 69.
181. It bears emphasizing that the fact-specific, equitable eBay framework allows for
tailoring injunctions to particular circumstances. See, e.g., Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. H-03-2910, 2006 WL 3813778, at *10 (S.D. Tex.
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improver to negotiate an ongoing royalty to compensate for prospective
infringement. If such negotiations failed, the court would determine and
impose a royalty on the defendant. 8 2 Similar to traditional property doc-
trine, accession in the patent realm would convert patent protection to a
liability rule in the context of substantially improving infringement. 83
Such an approach would ameliorate current limitations in patent law's
treatment of technological improvement and would accelerate the introduc-
tion of improved technologies to the marketplace. 84
Having outlined the proposal in broad strokes, the challenge, of
course, lies in fleshing out the details. In particular, potential application
of accession hinges considerably on whether an infringing technology em-
bodies a "substantial" improvement, a difficult concept to define. In general,
the objectives and risks of adapting accession to patent law should provide
a functional guide to defining the substantial improvement criterion. 5' In
the patent context, accession aims to promote efficiency and fairness where
a high-value, improved technology is subject to holdup by a lower-value
patent. However, liability-rule protection of patents comes at a cost because
Dec. 27, 2006) (granting an injunction mandating structural modifications to the accused
product).
182. While determining ongoing royalties for prospective infringement differs in certain
respects from determining reasonable royalties for past infringement, see infra Sections
IV.A.4, V.B.2, the statute governing the latter can help guide determinations of the former. See
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) ("Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as
fixed by the court."). In general, this Article will use "ongoing" royalty to refer to compensa-
tion for prospective infringement and "reasonable" royalty to refer to compensation for past
infringement.
183. Borrowing Henry Smith's terminology, this proposal would convert patent protec-
tion from an exclusion regime to a governance regime. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus
Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002);
Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 84, at 1728. Whereas exclusion regimes, as
the name implies, rest on a fairly categorical right to exclude, governance regimes provide
selective, use-specific access to a resource. A principal difficulty of governance regimes in-
volves identifying the particular uses that qualify for access, which would translate under this
proposal to identifying "substantially" improving infringements that qualify for the accession
rule. As discussed below, however, eBay and its progeny already encourage courts to weigh
the relative contributions of various sources to a technology, thus providing conceptual guid-
ance for identifying "substantial" technological improvements. See infra Section IV.B.
184. Under this proposal, accession would be available for substantially improved tech-
nologies found to infringe either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. However, given
the tendency of the doctrine of equivalents both to expand patent scope and to render it more
difficult to ascertain, fairness considerations may render liability-rule protection particularly
appropriate in situations of nonliteral infringement. Cf Holbrook, supra note 42, at 46-48
(suggesting liability-rule protection of patents when infringed under the doctrine of equiva-
lents); Smith, Intellectual Property, supra note 16, at 1818-19 (same).
185. Furthermore, this criterion is best understood within the context of the eBay frame-
work, as the "substantiality" of an improvement may bear on each of the four factors
informing the appropriateness of injunctive relief. See infra Section IV.A.2. For example, if an
infringing technology substantially improves on some underlying patent, the public interest in
allowing continued infringement may be very high.
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such regimes are expensive to administer and may undercompensate patent-
ees. 186 Furthermore, such regimes may spur strategic behavior whereby a
party trivially improves on an existing invention and then raises the threat of
liability-rule protection in negotiations with a patentee. All of these consid-
erations counsel in favor of a high standard for "substantial" improvement
both to ensure that the benefits of liability-rule protection are cost-justified
and to discipline strategic assertions of accession by infringers.
Under this proposal, identification of a "substantial" improvement would
involve a gestalt assessment encompassing both technical and economic
considerations. 187 Drawing on analogous concepts from physical property
accession, substantial improvement would be most evident where an infring-
ing technology "transforms" a patented invention rather than simply
modifies it incrementally. Here, the qualitative analysis of the reverse doc-
trine of equivalents-which relieves liability for literally infringing
technologies that operate in a "substantially different" manner from a pa-
tented invention-can help identify substantial improvements. 188
Additionally, courts may adapt familiar principles of nonobviousness analy-
sis to help identify substantial improvements. 8 9 Within this framework, a
notably strong showing of nonobviousness on the part of an infringing tech-
nology may indicate substantial technological improvement over an existing
patented invention. (Although courts do not generally examine the nonobvi-
ousness of accused inventions, such analysis may be especially appropriate
if in fact the accused technology is patented, as in the case of blocking
patents.) In particular, the technically oriented secondary considerations of
nonobviousness-such as satisfaction of long-felt needs, failure of others,
initial skepticism by experts, praise by technical artisans, teaching away in
the prior art, and copying by competitors-may inform the "substantial
improvement" analysis. 190 Ultimately, adopting earlier terminology, "sub-
stantial improvements" would encompass both "radical" improvements as
well as the upper technical end of "significant" improvements.' 9'
Additionally, courts should also consider the economic significance of
an improvement. Drawing on another test from physical property doctrine,
accession would apply where the improvement confers substantial economic
value relative to the original patented invention. This would generally arise
where the value of the improvement dominates the value of the underlying
patent in some new technology. Of course, distinguishing these values can
186. See infra Section V.B.2.
187. By requiring that improvements must demonstrate both technical and economic
importance, this proposal parallels compulsory "dependency license" provisions from interna-
tional and foreign patent law. See infra notes 296-303.
188. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,608-09 (1950).
189. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398 (2007).
190. See generally Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1380
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (identifying several secondary considerations); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (same).
191. See supra Section I.A.
[Vol. 110:175
The Accession Insight
be quite difficult. This difficulty is compounded by the open-ended nature of
patent claims, which cover an infinite set of physical embodiments pos-
sessing particular properties. For example, in comparing the value of a
patented genus (e.g., the basic design of a toothbrush) with an improved
species that falls within the genus (e.g., an electric toothbrush), one could
argue that the value of the pioneer patent already encompasses the value of
the infringing improvement (as well as all other species within the genus).
To avoid this circularity and concretize the inquiry, economic analysis
should focus, where available, on discrete products.' 92 Where a pioneer pa-
tentee produces or licenses a particular product and the improver also
produces some product, the relative price, profit, and market share of the
original and improved products may serve as proxies for determining sub-
stantial economic improvement.' 93 While valuation is likely to remain
difficult, courts need only resolve disputes in favor of infringers in clear cas-
es; where information is inadequate or judgments are "too close to call," a
default presumption against a finding of substantial economic improvement
would apply. Again, this high standard would screen out a significant pro-
portion of economically trivial improvements for which the cost and
uncertainty of liability-rule protection may not be justified.
This proposal would enhance patent law's treatment of technological
improvement in several ways. 9 4 To begin, this proposal would generally
leave untouched patent law's treatment of "minor" improvements that are
not independently patentable. If a subsequent party only trivially modified
some patented invention, the pioneer patent would continue to dominate that
subpatentable improvement. 195 This proposal, however, would change the
landscape for certain classes of "significant" (i.e., independently patentable)
192. As a general matter, this proposal focuses not only on the claimed inventions de-
scribed in patents but also on actual products that patentees have introduced to the market.
While acknowledging that claims define the scope of exclusive rights, this proposal notes that
the business practices of patentees-and the nature of the products that they produce, if any-
are highly relevant to determining appropriate remedies for infringing those rights. Cf eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting
that injunctive relief may be inappropriate for certain patent holders that produce nothing and
merely assert exclusive rights as a bargaining tool).
193. See Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note 56, at 79 (providing a schematic example
of such comparative valuation).
194. For a fuller exposition of the benefits of this proposal, see infra Section V.A.
195. See supra Section I.A. In theory, it is possible that a "minor" improvement to a
patented invention may be technically trivial, such that it does not satisfy the requirements of
independent patentability (especially nonobviousness), yet economically substantial, such that
the improved item derives a substantial majority of its value from the improvement rather than
the underlying patented invention. Amy L. Landers, Response, Patent Valuation Theory and
the Economics of Improvement, 88 Tax. L. REV. SEE ALSO 163, 165 (2009), available at
http://www.texasirev.com/sites/default/files/seealso/vol88/pdf/88TexasLRevSeeAlsol 63.pdf
("[A] modest technological advance may, due to luck or calculation, become economically
significant simply because a market has opened for reasons unrelated to the invention."). Even
for inventions within this class, however, the case for applying accession is difficult to make,




and "radical" improvements. Recall that in the tripartite scheme outlined
above, blocking patents encourage voluntary negotiations between a pioneer
patentee and a subsequent inventor who independently patents an improve-
ment. 96 As we have seen, however, transaction costs and strategic behavior
may prevent an agreement from arising. Even if one does arise, the split of
rents may be skewed in a fashion that undermines incentives to improve.
Enforcing the underlying patentee's rights with a liability rule rather than a
property rule would remove a significant source of leverage, 97 thus facilitat-
ing an arrangement in which one or both parties could practice the improved
invention.
This proposal also ameliorates current limitations concerning "radical"
improvements.' 98 While in theory the reverse doctrine of equivalents relieves
radical improvers of infringement liability, that doctrine is largely mori-
bund.'99 The current proposal allows radical improvers to pay royalties
instead of face an injunction if they continue to practice their new technolo-
gies. Application of a liability rule would thus mitigate patent holdup
predicated on the pioneer's strictright to exclude.2"
In advancing this proposal, this Article does not argue for a precise anal-
ogy between accession in the patent and physical property contexts. Indeed,
several important distinctions exist. First, in the physical property context,
accession operates as an equitable doctrine when return of some tangible
asset is either impossible (because its physical identity has changed) or un-
just. In the patent context, these concerns do not apply in the same manner:
an infringer who substantially improves on a patented invention does not
alter the identity of the underlying patent. Accordingly, it is both logically
and legally possible for the original patentee to maintain strict exclusive
rights over the same resource (the pioneer patent) even though it has been
substantially transformed by another.
Second, the "default" condition that accession modifies in the physical
property context is different from that in the patent context. In the former,
the default rule gives the original property owner full and exclusive title to
resources derived from his property, leaving the improver with nothing. In
the patent context, the default condition already envisions (blocking) patent
196. See supra Part 1.
197. Cf Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 16, at 1533 (proposing an "added-value
doctrine" for copyright in which a copyrighted work that is less original than an infringing
work would receive liability-rule protection).
198. See supra Part I.
199. Interestingly, Parchomovsky and Stein draw from patent law's reverse doctrine of
equivalents to propose a "doctrine of inequivalents" for copyright that would exempt excep-
tionally creative and original works from infringement liability. Parchomovsky & Stein, supra
note 16, at 1525-32. My proposal differs in that even substantial improvements to patented
inventions may still be subject to infringement liability. This proposal is not intended to sup-
plant the reverse doctrine of equivalents, which would still be available to courts. Rather, it
creates additional flexibility by focusing not on completely eliminating liability but on cali-
brating an appropriate remedy for substantially improving infringers.
200. See Cotter, supra note 71, at 1174-87.
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rights for the substantial improver; she thus has something even in the ab-
sence of the accession rule. 2 1' This Article argues, however, that substantial
improvements deserve more protection than the current blocking patents
paradigm provides. Rather than argue for direct conceptual identity, this Ar-
ticle proposes that patent remedies analysis apply the accession insight that
a meaningful degree of ownership should shift when one party makes sub-
stantial, value-enhancing improvements to the property of another.
20
Third, the "value-added" character of the underlying assets subject to
the accession rule differ markedly in both contexts. In the typical case of
physical property accession, the underlying asset is a raw material, such as
wood, 20 3 corn, 204 grapes, olives, or wheat. 20 5 Any transformative improve-
ment of those materials into hoops, whiskey, wine, oil, or bread appears
quite dramatic, due in part to the unrefined nature of the original resource.
In the patent context, however, the starting material subject to transformative
improvement is itself a highly refined asset, namely a patented invention.
While this status may render "transformation" less visibly obvious, it should
not foreclose application of the accession insight. It is, of course, possible to
enhance the value of an already "cooked" material as well as a "raw" one.
20 6
After all, it is this marginal added value that the accession rule endeavors to
protect. The underlying logic of accession does not distinguish between im-
provements to "raw" or "cooked" source materials.
Fourth, the role and sufficiency of accession in transferring title differs
between the patent and physical property contexts. In the physical realm,
accession alone justifies shifting ownership of some improved property from
plaintiff to defendant. This proposal, however, offers the accession insight as
a consideration that can inform, to varying degrees, each of the four factors
in the eBay analysis. While substantial improvement of a patentee's inven-
tion would weigh in favor of liability-rule protection, other considerations
encompassed in the eBay framework may make that conclusion more or less
legally tenable.
201. Given the presence of overlapping exclusive rights, however, the value of this some-
thing is heavily dependent on the pioneer patentee's willingness to license the underlying
patent. See supra Section I.B.
202. This proposal thus represents a "simultaneous pliability rule" in which there are "at
least two different stages of property or liability-rule protection, and the fulfillment of a prede-
termined condition triggers a shift from one type of protection to the other." Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 49 (2002). Unlike other simul-
taneous pliability rules in intellectual property law, such as copyright's fair use doctrine, this
proposal would require the unauthorized user to compensate the original intellectual property
owner.
203. See, e.g., Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311 (1871).
204. See, e.g., Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N.Y. 379 (1850).
205. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *404.
206. See Lee, Intellectual Infrastructure, supra note 103, at 44 & n.16 (discussing the
concepts of "raw" and "cooked" intellectual assets).
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1. Mental State
While analogies can illuminate, doctrines must be tailored to individual
fields and contexts. Along the lines of distinctions, this Article proposes a
very different approach to the requirement of good faith when adapting ac-
cession to patent law. This Article applies the general accession insight that
substantially improving infringement should result in liability-rule protec-
tion of an underlying asset. However, while good faith plays a critical role in
physical property applications of accession, I suggest that in the patent con-
text, the mental state of the defendant should simply be one factor that
informs the grant or denial of injunctive relief. Ultimately, the unique char-
acter of patent law and the availability of other safeguards that serve a
similar function counsel against adopting a strict good faith requirement in
the present proposal.
Since the civil law origins of accession, 20 7 courts applying the "mistaken
improver" doctrine have placed great emphasis on the requirement of good
faith.2"8 As a doctrinal matter, courts generally hold that those who improve
property that they know belongs to someone else may not benefit from this
equitable rule.20 9 As a policy matter, the good faith requirement plays an
important role in discouraging strategic behavior. Absent this requirement,
improvers would have strong incentives to knowingly and intentionally
convert personal property owned by others, secure in the knowledge that if
they substantially improved that property, they could force a sale at a
court-determined price. Such forced sales tend to undercompensate prop-
erty owners,210 thus providing a windfall for improvers.
While concerns over strategic behavior apply to the patent realm as well,
the particularities of that field call for a different approach to mental state.
For a variety of pragmatic and policy reasons explained below, I do not pro-
pose a strict good faith requirement for an infringer to benefit from the
accession insight in patent law.
Of course, courts can and should consider the good faith of a substan-
tially improving infringer as a factor weighing in favor of extending
liability-rule protection to a pioneer patent."1' For reasons analogous to the
physical property context, the case for accession is arguably most compel-
207. See Wetherbee, 22 Mich. at 315-16; Silsbury, 3 N.Y. at 387.
208. In some instances, however, courts have granted title even to improvers who will-
fully took someone else's property. See Arnold, supra note 121, at 105-06 (discussing the
"physical identity" approach to accession cases, in which ownership of the ultimate product
depends not on the good faith of the improver but on whether the identity of the property has
fundamentally changed).
209. See id. at 107 (stating that courts following a willful trespass approach to accession
generally deny knowing improvers a right to the property they improve).
210. See infra Section V.B.2.
211. Cf Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 F Supp. 2d 951, 970 (N.D. Cal.
2009) ("But where infringement is not willful, perhaps because of serious questions as to the
patent's validity ... the potential destruction of an infringer's business should carry some
weight in the balancing of harms under the four-factor test reaffirmed in eBay.").
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ling for parties who infringe in good faith. Here, the "taking" of another
party's intellectual property is unintentional, and a court must allocate prop-
erty rights and compensation between two "innocent" parties. As a general
matter, defendants could manifest good faith in several ways. First, as with
physical accession, a truly "innocent" infringer who did not know and did
not have good reason to know of the existence of a patent would demon-
strate good faith. 212 Second, an infringer who knew about a patent but had a
good faith belief that the patent was invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed
by her product could also demonstrate good faith.213 This latter possibility is
particularly likely given the notoriously indeterminate metes and bounds of
many patent claims. 21
4
Although good faith would not be required, empirical evidence suggests
that a significant proportion of infringers would likely satisfy this mental
state. Empirical work by Chris Cotropia and Mark Lemley reveals that in-
tentional "copying"-the classic exemplar of "bad faith" infringement-is
quite rare in patent litigation.215 Their study of patent infringement suits
from 2000 to 2007 found that plaintiffs only alleged copying in 10.9 percent
of all complaints and that courts only found copying in 1.76 percent of all
litigated cases. 216 Among other implications, these findings suggest that
most improving infringers do not knowingly copy or build on existing pa-
tented inventions when developing their improvements. 21 7
That being said, pragmatic and policy considerations, as well as the
availability of other safeguards, counsel against a strict good faith require-
ment. First, as a doctrinal matter, courts applying eBay have denied
injunctive relief even in cases involving willful infringement. 218 While
212. See Merges, Property Rules, supra note 50, at 2658 ("[A]n infringer may have no
way of knowing that her own independent invention is an infringement, or that, at the time she
makes her investment decisions, a patent even exists.").
213. In this circumstance, an infringer would most likely establish good faith by obtain-
ing an opinion letter from patent counsel. Cf. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1369
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (suggesting that opinion of counsel, though not necessary, is an
important consideration in avoiding willful infringement). Although good faith infringement is
not necessarily coextensive with the absence of willfulness, doctrine regarding willful in-
fringement may be helpful in analyzing good faith.
214. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, Fence Posts, supra note 79, at 1750 ("[D]isagreements
over the meanings of patent claims are pandemic."); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quan-
tum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 31 (2005) ("Courts define an element
[of a claim] almost arbitrarily, and even when judges disagree as to the proper definition they
offer no principled basis for doing so."); Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Uncertainty about Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1331-33 (2008) (discussing the
extent and dangers of "uncertainty about the scope and existence" of patent rights).
215. Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L.
REV. 1421 (2009).
216. Id. at 1424.
217. Id. at 1465.
218. eBay itself involved willful infringers. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F.
Supp. 2d. 695 (E.D. Va. 2003); see also z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d




willful infringement is not necessarily coextensive with the absence of
good faith, these rulings suggest that culpable mental state should not au-
tomatically foreclose the possibility of liability-rule protection of an
infringed patent. Indeed, other factors such as the adequacy of legal reme-
dies, the balance of hardships, and the public's interest in accessing some
improved technology may plausibly outweigh a defendant's knowing in-
fringement in deciding whether to issue injunctive relief.2 19
Second, mental state inquiries are costly, and a good faith requirement
may be particularly costly in patent law. As a general matter, mental state
inquiries impose substantial difficulties on courts. Ascertaining the contents
of a defendant's mind is always challenging, particularly if she has a strong
incentive to represent herself as acting in good faith. Furthermore, a strict
good faith requirement may encourage inefficiently high search expendi-
tures on the part of potential infringers. 220 It is important to note that the
costs of ascertaining and avoiding prior ownership interests are likely to be
much higher in the patent context than in the physical property context.2 21
While boundary disputes arise in real estate, the existence of land registries
provides fairly clear notice of property rights. Similarly, the physical prox-
imity of chattel to an owner or her land renders ownership interests in
tangible personal property relatively easy to ascertain. Such is not the case
with patents. While patents are published and readily accessible, the "no-
tice" that they provide may be quite lacking. As Christopher Newman
observes, the mere existence of a patent does not necessarily indicate the
presence of a valid property interest, as close to half of all litigated patents
are ruled invalid. 2 2 Furthermore, even assuming that a patent is valid, ques-
tions still remain about its enforceability 223 and whether an improved
technology actually infringes it. Indeed, obtaining conclusive determinations
of validity, enforceability, and infringement may require litigating a case to
final judgment, which is a very expensive proposition. 2 4 Ultimately, the
difficulty of ascertaining and avoiding prior ownership interests calls into
question the cost justification and administrability of a strict good faith re-
quirement.
219. See infra Section IV.A.2.
220. See Sterk, supra note 214, at 1331-33.
221. See Newman, Patent Infringement, supra note 17, at 116-18.
222. Id. at 117. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Va-
lidity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 194, 205 (1998) (finding in a set of cases from
1989 to 1996 that 46 percent of final validity decisions by district courts and the Federal Cir-
cuit held the patent at issue invalid).
223. Defendants commonly allege that patents are unenforceable because of inequitable
conduct on the part of the patentee during prosecution. Inequitable conduct has been the sub-
ject of much doctrinal controversy, which the Federal Circuit has recently attempted to
resolve. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., Nos. 2008-1511, 2008-1512, 2008-
1513, 2008-1514, 2008-1595, 2011 WL 2028255 (Fed. Cit. May 25, 2011) (en banc).
224. See Newman, Patent Infringement, supra note 17, at 117-18.
[Vol. 110:175
The Accession Insight
Third, viewed from another perspective, insisting on good faith may cre-
ate perverse incentives for potential infringers to not search patents. 225 If an
infringer could only benefit from accession by infringing in "good faith," he
might be discouraged from searching for and finding patents, thereby jeop-
ardizing his good faith status. This reluctance to search would undermine
the teaching function of patents and tend to inhibit cumulative technical ad-
vance. In sum, a variety of doctrinal and pragmatic reasons counsel against
adopting a mental state requirement for the accession rule.
While the absence of a good faith requirement raises anxieties about
rampant intentional infringement by potential improvers, several mecha-
nisms are available to discipline such behavior. First, as noted above, the
requirement of "substantial improvement"-which has both technical and
economic dimensions-promises to constrain significantly the universe of
improving infringements that would qualify for accession treatment. Second,
patent law already contains provisions that deter willful infringement.
226
Again, while the definition of willful infringement is not necessarily coexten-
sive with the absence of good faith, willfulness doctrine can serve a salutary
function by discouraging knowing infringement of existing patents. The
ability of courts to treble damages for willful infringement provides a strong
incentive against acting in an objectively reckless manner with respect to
existing property rights.227 However, though the willful infringement doc-
trine can help police infringing behavior,228 for the reasons noted above, a
finding of willful infringement should not automatically lead to the grant of
injunctive relief.229
225. Cf. Sterk, supra note 214, at 1313 (arguing that protecting "innocent encroachers"
with a liability rule creates "perverse incentives not to search"). This is, of course, a prominent
criticism of the current willful infringement regime. See generally In re Seagate, 497 F.3d
1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (establishing the current "objective recklessness" stand-
ard for willful infringement).
226. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
227. See id.
228. See Newman, Patent Infringement, supra note 17, at 120 (stressing the role of will-
ful infringement doctrine in encouraging knowing infringers to settle with patentees).
229. Cf id. (arguing that willful infringement should not render a defendant ineligible to
invoke the accession rule). The availability of liability-rule treatment even for willful infring-
ers raises a related question of whether ongoing royalties should be enhanced, since, almost by
definition, prospective infringers would be willful infringers. While case law is still develop-
ing in this area, early decisions cast doubt on the appropriateness of enhancing ongoing
royalties for postjudgment infringement based on willfulness. See, e.g., Paice LLC v. Toyota
Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 624 (E.D. Tex. 2009) ("[W]hen an injunction is not proper
under eBay, the question instead becomes: what amount of money would reasonably compen-
sate a patentee for giving up his right to exclude yet allow an ongoing willful infringer to
make a reasonable profit?"); cf. Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (vacating the district court's enhanced damages award based on continued infringement
after staying an injunction). As Mark Lemley notes, this reluctance to enhance ongoing royal-
ties makes sense given that a court has already "decided that the defendant should be allowed
to continue to sell the infringing product because enjoining it imposes too great a hardship on
either the defendant or the public." Mark A. Lemley, The Ongoing Confusion Over Ongoing
Royalties (Stanford Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working
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2. Integrating the Accession Insight within the eBay Analysis
Under this proposal, elements critical to accession doctrine in the physi-
cal property context-such as considerations of value-enhancing
improvement-would be subsumed within the four-factor eBay framework.
It is important to stress that the plaintiff carries the burden of proving each
of the four eBay factors to justify a grant of injunctive relief.230 It is, of
course, difficult to establish categorical rules for this holistic framework,2 31
and it is not the case that accession will necessarily trump all other consid-
erations. Nonetheless, it is worth highlighting how substantial improvement
of a pioneer patent would weigh against enjoining infringement. 232
First, the plaintiff must establish that the improver's infringement caused
irreparable injury.2 33 As a general matter, introducing a substantially im-
proved (and infringing) technology will tend to cause irreparable injury, thus
tipping this factor in favor of the patentee. However, this need not be the
case. In examining this factor, courts applying eBay have rejected a pre-
sumption that irreparable harm arises from the mere fact of patent
infringement.234 In general, harm to the patentee is greatest in cases of direct
competition with the infringer.235 But where the patentee produces a "basic"
Paper No. 1793361, 2011) [hereinafter Lemley, Ongoing Royalties], available at http://papers.
ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1793361. But see Newman, Patent Infringement, supra
note 17, at 119 (arguing that enhanced ongoing royalties serve the valuable function of disci-
plining assertions of accession and encouraging negotiations between patentees and potential
infringers).
230. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
231. This proposal thus adheres to the principle of "nonabsolutism" in applying patent
infringement remedies. See Golden, Remedies, supra note 32, at 553-55. I use the term "holis-
tic" to highlight the contextually sensitive nature of the eBay standard, which considers more
situational factors than the Federal Circuit's previous test for granting injunctive relief.
232. In so doing, it bears emphasizing that several of the factors, particularly one and
two, overlap considerably. See, e.g., Funai Electric Co. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., 593 F.
Supp. 2d 1088, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C
5312, 2008 WL 4531371, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2008); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1219 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
233. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. As John Golden notes, it is somewhat curious why the Su-
preme Court framed this requirement in the past tense, as it seems that the operative question
is whether the defendant's ongoing infringement would constitute an irreparable injury. John
M. Golden, The Supreme Court as "Prime Percolator": A Prescription for Appellate Review
of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REv. 657, 695-96 (2009).
234. See, e.g., z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex.
2006); Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-512-L, 2006 WL 2570614, *5 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5,
2006).
235. Indeed, courts applying eBay commonly grant injunctions where the patentee and
infringer are direct competitors. See, e.g., Tivo Inc. v. EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., 446 F. Supp.
2d 664, 669-70 (E.D. Tex. 2006); Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath ofeBay v. Merc-
Exchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), 89 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 631, 654 (2007);
Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing Landscape for Patent
Remedies, 9 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TEcH. 543, 549-55 (2008); John M. Golden, Commentary,
"Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 Tax. L. REv. 2111, 2113 (2007) [hereinafter Golden,
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technology and has no plans or technical capacity to market an improve-
ment, direct competition may be absent, and irreparable injury may be more
difficult to establish. Along these lines, even if an infringing technology is a
substantial improvement, it may not necessarily displace the pioneer patent-
ee's product. In some cases, market bifurcation may arise whereby the
original technology remains a viable "low-cost" alternative to the improve-
ment.236 While the original patentee will likely face some price erosion from
the improvement's entry into the market, it is possible that this harm may be
adequately redressed through monetary compensation.237 Depending on the
circumstances, the lack of direct competition between a substantial im-
provement and an existing patented technology may weigh against a finding
of irreparable injury.3
Second, a plaintiff must demonstrate that remedies at law, such as dam-
ages, are inadequate to compensate for the injury. 39 Here, the accession
insight weighs strongly against enjoining a substantially improved technol-
ogy. Where substantial improvements, rather than an underlying patent,
dominate the value of some new technology, damages may be adequate to
compensate for infringement, and enjoining the technology may be exces-
sive. 24° This is particularly the case for new technologies that fundamentally
"transform" an underlying patented invention. Though analytically distinct,
an analogy could be drawn to a complex, integrated system that infringes a
patent covering a relatively minor component. 241 In these cases as well,
damages may sufficiently compensate for infringement, and enjoining the
Patent Trolls]; Jeremy Mulder, Note, The Aftermath of eBay: Predicting When District Courts
Will Grant Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 67, 81 (2007).
236. See Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note 56, at 79-80.
237. Furthermore, even if the improvement completely displaces the legacy technology,
courts must weigh this harm against the social benefits of competitive innovation. Cf Keeble
v. Hickeringill, (1707) 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Q.B.) (distinguishing legitimate economic compe-
tition from malicious interference with trade).
238. Cf Gordon, supra note 32, at 238-48 (questioning the imposition of liability where
a creator and free rider compete in separate markets and the plaintiff has no plans to enter the
other's market).
239. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
240. Cf Hamilton v. Rock, 191 P.2d 663, 668 (Mont. 1948) ("[T]he plaintiff [in an ac-
cession case] should not be permitted to enjoy the fruits of defendant's labor without paying
therefor."); Gordon, supra note 32, at 259 ("[I]njunctions bring with them the threat of over-
deterrence because a defendant's product may mix inextricably the defendant's own resources
with those of the plaintiff."); Lemley & Weiser, supra note 90, at 785 (noting that in some
situations, "injunctive relief can systematically overcompensate plaintiffs and overdeter de-
fendants, with significant negative consequences for innovation and economic growth"); Sterk,
supra note 214, at 1329 ("The problem is exacerbated when the infringed material represents a
small fraction of the value of significant infringing work.").
241. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 47.
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system may be unwarranted.242 As we will see, case law applying eBay has
already recognized and applied this core concept.2 43
Third, the plaintiff must show that the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant favors an equitable remedy.2" Here again, the acces-
sion insight weighs against an injunction. As discussed in the context of the
first two factors, the plaintiff's hardship from ongoing infringement may not
be so great if (1) the plaintiff and defendant are not direct competitors, and
(2) damages adequately compensate for the infringement. On the other side
of the ledger, the fact that the defendant created a substantial improvement
suggests that she would endure considerable hardship (in the form of wasted
effort and unrealized commercial value) if the court awarded an injunction.
This hardship would be particularly likely if the defendant has made signifi-
cant, irreversible investments in practicing the improved technology.245 As
Newman notes, such situations are ripe for patent holdup where a pioneer
patentee may extract a disproportionate share of rents from parties who have
few alternatives to practicing a patent.
2 46
Finally, the plaintiff must show that the public interest would not be dis-
served by a permanent injunction.247 Here as well, accession weighs against
enjoining an improved technology. The Federal Circuit has consistently ar-
ticulated a public policy interest in maintaining incentives to invent by
protecting patents with a strong right to exclude. 248 On occasion, however,
courts have determined that the public interest weighs against enjoining
patent infringement. 249 In particular, courts have sometimes permitted con-
tinued infringement of an "upstream" patent to promote "downstream"
242. See z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex. 2006);
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. (Paice 1), No. 2:04-CV-21 I-DF, 2006 WL 2385139 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 16, 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Paice II).
243. See infra Section IV.B.
244. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
245. See Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 951, 967 (N.D. Cal,
2009) ("Extensive sunk costs present another opportunity for a patent holder to extract a dis-
proportionate sum from an infringer because the infringer cannot recover its existing
investment.").
246. See Newman, Patent Infringement, supra note 17, at 69-70.
247. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
248. See, e.g., Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting
that the "encouragement of investment-based risk is the fundamental purpose of the patent
grant, and is based directly on the right to exclude"); Tivo Inc. v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp.,
446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 670 (E.D. Tex. 2006) ("The public has an interest in maintaining a strong
patent system.").
249. This is most evident in cases involving health-related patents. See, e.g., Vitamin
Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1945); City
of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934); cf Hybritech Inc. v.
Abbott Labs., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1015 (C.D. Cal. 1987) ("Whatever else the court
does, it will not cut off the supply of [patented] monoclonal test kits for cancer patients who
are now using the [infringing] Abbott product."), aff'd, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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productivity.250 Such interests are particularly at issue when a party seeks to
practice a substantially improved technology that infringes an existing pa-
tent. In these cases, the public would benefit considerably from the
improved technology, and denying an injunction may in fact advance the
patent system's overall goal of promoting technological progress. 25 1
3. Facilitating Appropriate Compensation
Under this Article's proposal, accession would operate within the multi-
factor eBay framework to weigh against enjoining a substantially improved
technology that infringes some underlying patent. However, denying the
injunction is not the end of the story. In traditional accession doctrine,
awarding title to the improved item to the defendant is contingent upon the
defendant compensating the original property owner for the value of the
source material. By analogy, courts applying this proposal would generally
compel a defendant to pay royalties to a pioneer patentee as a condition of
ongoing infringement. 252 The determination and enforcement of such royal-
ties, however, could proceed along two very different paths.
First, and preferably, the parties themselves could negotiate an ongoing
royalty. As discussed further below, the difficulties of valuing technologies
and determining appropriate compensation may complicate court-
determined royalty awards. 253 Therefore, in applying accession, courts deny-
ing injunctive relief should first direct the parties to negotiate an ongoing
royalty between themselves.2 54 This approach would both decrease burdens
on courts and enhance the accuracy of valuations,255 and it has become
standard practice for courts applying eBay.256 As the Federal Circuit ob-
served in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.:
250. See Lee, Intellectual Infrastructure, supra note 103, at 112-14; z4 Techs., Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 443-44 (E.D. Tex. 2006); cf Paice I, No. 2:04-CV-21 1-
DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 504 E3d
1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Paice I1).
251. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that Congress shall have power "[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
252. As an additional lever, it is conceivable that a court could deny an injunction, calcu-
late a royalty, but then enhance royalties for ongoing infringement based on willfulness. See
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). However, doctrinal and prudential considerations generally counsel
against such a practice. See supra note 229.
253. See infra Section V.B.2.
254. See, e.g., Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., No. 06-CV-462-bbc, 2010 WL
1607908, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 2010) (denying injunctive relief and directing parties to
negotiate an appropriate royalty).
255. In a counterintuitive manner, liability rules may thus advance the principle of devo-
lution, which favors allowing parties "closest to the facts" to resolve disputes rather than
higher-level institutions. See Golden, Remedies, supra note 32, at 564-69.
256. In adopting this approach, courts may subtly (or not so subtly) coerce parties to
negotiate a mutually satisfactory resolution. See Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc.,
609 F. Supp. 2d 951, 987 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("And to be clear, the court 'strongly encourages
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In most cases, where the district court determines that a permanent injunc-
tion is not warranted, the district court may wish to allow the parties to
negotiate a license amongst themselves regarding future use of a patented
invention before imposing an ongoing royalty. Should the parties fail to
come to an agreement, the district court could step in to assess a reasona-
ble royalty in light of the ongoing infringement.
5 7
Ultimately, this proposal to limit injunctive relief is best understood not as
a mechanism to displace private ordering. Rather, it seeks to encourage nego-
tiations between private parties while modifying the balance of powerzst
between them by eliminating a pioneer's categorical right to exclude. 259 Under
this proposal, parties would negotiate in the "shadow" of a court-imposed
liability rule rather than against a background of strict exclusive rights.260
Second, however, if private negotiations failed, a court could directly
calculate and award an ongoing royalty. As an initial matter, some commen-
tators have expressed doubt over the authority of courts to issue ongoing
royalties after denying an injunction.261 For example, T6mas G6mez-
Arostegui has reviewed the history of patent and copyright actions in the
United States and England, concluding that U.S courts lack legal and equi-
table authority to award compulsory prospective compensation for
postjudgment infringement. 262 These conclusions, however, are contested on
historical and legal grounds. 263 Furthermore, as a matter of positive doctrine,
the Federal Circuit has affirmed that courts are in fact empowered to grant
ongoing royalties,264 and several have done so. 265 Substantively, at least one
the parties to be reasonable in their negotiations.'" (citing Telecordia Techs., Inc. v. Cisco
Sys., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 727, 748 (D. Del. 2009))).
257. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. (Paice 1/), 504 F.3d 1293, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
258. See Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note 56, at 77 (noting that under historical,
pro-injunction jurisprudence, the patentee may set the terms of a license agreement in an in-
fringement settlement negotiation).
259. Cf Lee, Intellectual Infrastructure, supra note 103, at 109; Merges, Blocking Pa-
tents, supra note 56, at 76 (observing that uncertainty regarding whether courts will apply the
reverse doctrine of equivalents encourages parties to strike deals in more cases).
260. Theoretical work by Ian Ayres and Eric Talley shows that, contrary to conventional
sentiment, "untailored" liability rules (i.e., liability rules that are somewhat divorced from
actual damages) may encourage more negotiations between plaintiffs and defendants than
property rules. Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement
To Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1036-72 (1995); see infra Section V.A.2.
261. See, e.g., Chao, supra note 235, at 566-68; H. T6mas G6mez-Arostegui, Prospec-
tive Compensation in Lieu of a Final Injunction in Patent and Copyright Cases, 78 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1661 (2010); Michael C. Brandt, Note, Compulsory Licenses in the Aftermath ofeBay
Inc. v. MercExchange LLC: The Courts'Authority to Impose Prospective Compensatory Re-
lieffor Patent Infringement, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 699 (2008).
262. G6mez-Arostegui, supra note 261, at 1664-65.
263. See Lemley, Ongoing Royalties, supra note 229, at 5 n.19.
264. Paice I1, 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 283); Crane,
Intellectual Liability, supra note 23, at 292.
265. See, e.g., Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 WL
2037617, at *1-2 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2006), rev'd in part on other grounds, 523 F.3d 1323
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court has held that "when an injunction is not proper under eBay, the ques-
tion then becomes: 'what amount of money would reasonably compensate a
patentee for giving up his right to exclude yet allow an ongoing willful in-
fringer to make a reasonable profit?' ,,26 In this vein, courts could draw on




To illustrate this proposal, consider a historical example involving radio
technology. In the early twentieth century, the Marconi Wireless & Tele-
graph Company patented a series of oscillating radio diodes.16 ' Lee De
Forest, a leading inventor of radio technology, patented a substantial im-
provement, the oscillating triode, which amplified electrical signals and thus
exhibited much greater sensitivity in radio reception.2 69 This triode both in-
corporated and improved on the earlier diode. Ultimately, AT&T obtained
De Forest's triode patents and attempted to commercialize the technology.
However, Marconi sued for infringement, and the Southern District of New
York held that De Forest's triode infringed one of Marconi's diode pa-
tents.270 Neither party would license the other, and no firm exploited this
important technology for an extended period of time. 27'
Under my proposal, a court applying the eBay framework would take
greater account of the considerable technological and economic value of De
Forest's improvement over Marconi's pioneer patent. Such considerations
would weigh in favor of enforcing Marconi's patent with a liability rule ra-
ther than a property rule. The court would then direct the two parties to
negotiate an ongoing royalty and would impose one itself if they failed to do
so. In this manner, through applying the accession insight, a court could
enforce Marconi's patent in a manner that facilitated dissemination of the
substantial improvement.272
A more recent case provides another illustrative example. In the 1980s,
Genetics Institute ("GI") patented "isolated and purified" erythropoietin
("EPO"), a hormone that regulates red blood cell production. While GI
(Fed. Cir. 2008); Paice 1, No. 2:04-CV-21 1-DF, 2006 WL 2385139 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 504 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Paice II).
266. Creative Internet Adver. Corp. v. Yahoo! Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 847, 850 (E.D. Tex.
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
267. See infra Section V.B.2.
268. Ayres & Talley, supra note 260, at 1093; see also Merges & Nelson, supra note 31,
at 891.
269. As an indication of the importance of De Forest's invention, the triode has been
called "the heart and soul of radio." GEORGE H. DOUGLAS, THE EARLY DAYS OF RADIO
BROADCASTING 8 (1987).
270. Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co., 236 F. 942
(S.D.N.Y. 1916), aff'd, 243 F. 560 (2d Cir. 1917).
271. Merges & Nelson, supra note 31, at 892.
272. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 260, at 1093.
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utilized traditional techniques to isolate and purify this hormone, Amgen
began producing EPO through the use of recombinant DNA technology.
Among other advantages, Amgen's process conferred significant economic
value; use of recombinant DNA technology greatly accelerated the produc-
tion of EPO, thus facilitating clinical applications of this hormone for
patients suffering from anemia. In Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical
Co., Amgen and GI sued each other for patent infringement.27 3 While the
Federal Circuit ultimately invalidated GI's claims on enablement grounds,
27 4
GI's patent had the potential to hold up a significant technological advance.
After all, while Amgen's EPO represented a substantial improvement over
GI's patented invention, it technically fell within the scope of some of GI's
claims.275
Under my proposal, had GI's claims been affirmed as valid, GI would
not have enjoyed a categorical right to exclude Amgen's infringing im-
provement. Rather, due regard for Amgen's substantial contributions in
genetically engineering EPO would have counseled in favor of-at most-
liability-rule protection of GI's patent,276 thus facilitating the dissemination
of Amgen's important technology. Applying principles of accession within
the eBay framework would help achieve this result.
77
B. Consistency with Recent Jurisprudence
While this proposal may appear radical, eBay and its progeny already re-
flect several elements of the accession insight. This proposal to apply
accession doctrine relies critically on courts weighing the relative values of
pioneer patents and accused improvements in determining whether to enjoin
infringement. In a different sense, eBay itself already embraces this notion
of comparing the relative values of patented inventions and accused prod-
ucts. In particular, Justice Kennedy's eBay concurrence illustrates this
insight:
When the patented invention is but a small component of the product the
companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed
273. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
274. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1217.
275. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls, supra note 37, at 1596.
276. From one perspective, Amgen represents a prime candidate for the reverse doctrine
of equivalents, which would have completely relieved Amgen from liability for infringing GI's
patent on EPO. Cf Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (reversing summary judgment ruling that a genetically engineered protein infringed
a patent on the same protein derived from purifying human blood); Lemley, Economics of
Improvement, supra note 31, at 1011. As noted above, however, courts have been extremely
reluctant to invoke the reverse doctrine of equivalents. The accession rule is not intended to
displace that doctrine, but it does provide an intermediate (and perhaps more palatable) ap-
proach to allocating property rights and compensating patentees in the context of substantially
improving infringement.
277. See Merges, The Trouble with Trolls, supra note 37, at 1610 ("What the Court rec-
ognized in eBay was that it must police the line between rent-seeking and innovation.").
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simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be suf-
ficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve
the public interest.
278
This observation parallels the underlying logic of the accession insight,
which compels courts to compare the relative values of an underlying patent
and a broader, infringing technology when determining the appropriateness
of injunctive relief.
Courts have applied Justice Kennedy's instruction to deny injunctive re-
lief in cases in which a multifaceted product infringes a patent on a
relatively low-value component. For example, in z4 Technologies, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp.,279 a jury found that Microsoft Windows and Office in-
fringed z4's patents on software activation technology.2 ° However, the
district court denied z4's request for injunctive relief. In analyzing irrepara-
ble harm, the court observed that "Microsoft only uses the infringing
technology as a small component of its own software, and it is not likely
that any consumer of Microsoft's Windows or Office software purchases
these products for their product activation functionality. '28' This considera-
tion also informed the court's analysis of the adequacy of legal remedies.
Citing Justice Kennedy's guidance, the court noted that "product activation
is a very small component of the Microsoft Windows and Office software
products" and that "[tlhe infringing product activation component of the
software is in no way related to the core functionality for which the software
is purchased by consumers. 2 82 Here, the fact that z4's patented component
contributed marginally to the overall value of Microsoft Windows and Office
weighed against granting an injunction.
Similar considerations informed the district court's denial of injunctive
relief in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.283 In that case, a jury found that
Toyota had infringed Paice's patents on hybrid transmission technology by
selling several lines of hybrid cars. However, the district court denied
Paice's request for an injunction.284 In analyzing the adequacy of damages,
the court observed, "The infringed claims relate to the hybrid transmissions
of the accused vehicles, but form only a small aspect of the overall vehicles.
The jury's damages award also indicates that the infringed claims constitute
a very small part of the value of the overall vehicles. ''285 In the court's view,
278. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396-97 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); see also Lemley & Weiser, supra note 90, at 797-98 (describing this phenome-
non).
279. 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
280. z4 Techs., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 438. The jury also found that codefendant Autodesk
had infringed z4's patents. Id.
281. Id. at440.
282. Id. at 441.
283. No. 2:04-CV-21 I-DF, 2006 WL 2385139 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (Paice I), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 504 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Paice If).
284. Paice 1, 2006 WL 2385139, at *6.
285. Id. at *5.
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this disparity in value helped to render damages adequate to compensate
Paice for Toyota's infringement. 286
Thus, eBay and its progeny already exhibit elements of the proportional-
ity analysis at the heart of accession doctrine. 28 7 To be sure, important
distinctions are in order. z4 and Paice involved patentees seeking to enjoin
multifaceted products (software and cars) that incorporated a relatively mi-
nor patented component. Analytically, these cases are distinct from the
holder of a patented genus seeking to enjoin a party from practicing a sub-
stantially improved species that falls within that genus. Furthermore,
distinguishing the values of, say, a product activation component and the
rest of Microsoft Windows is likely easier than distinguishing the values of a
patented genus and an improved species. 288 Nonetheless, at a conceptual
level, the notion of proportionality still governs. Where the value of some
technology derives substantially from a party's own technological contribu-
tion rather than from some underlying patent that it infringes, the rationale
behind protecting that pioneer patent with a strict property rule loses force.
V. ADVANTAGES, OBJECTIONS, AND RESPONSES
A. Advantages
1. Encouraging Technological Improvement
The principal advantage of applying accession to patent infringement
remedies is to encourage the dissemination of substantially improved tech-
nologies. This would occur in at least two ways. First, the proposal would
facilitate technological improvement by parties other than the original pa-
tentee. Under the present system, transaction costs and strategic behavior
may derail licensing negotiations in the blocking patents paradigm, and the
reverse doctrine of equivalents is largely moribund.289 Therefore, substantial
improvers invent and market new technologies at their own peril. These
technologies may infringe existing patents, and while pioneer patentees may
agree to a license, the strict right to exclude affords them significant lever-
age over improvements. The current proposal would alter the playing field
286. Id.
287. See, e.g., Laserdynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-348-TJW,
2010 WL 2574059, *2 (E.D. Tex. June 22, 2010) ("Further, the claimed invention embodied in
the disc-drive is but one relatively small component of the entire assembled computer. When
the patented invention is but a small component of the accused product, it weights [sic] against
a finding of a permanent injunction." (citation omitted)); Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus
Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 951, 966 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("A patent to a technological sliver enables its
owner to threaten to enjoin the manufacture of use of the entire device, and in turn, receive a
payoff far greater than the value of its invention." (citation omitted)).
288. Of course, this is a relative claim, and assigning specific values to components
within an integrated system may be quite challenging. Golden, Remedies, supra note 32, at
536.
289. See supra Section I.B.
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by allowing a substantially improving infringer to face liability-rule rather
than property-rule protection of a patent. The result would recalibrate the
balance of power between pioneers and improvers and would enhance in-
centives for inventors to improve on existing patented technologies. Case
studies of technological development have suggested that rivalrous competi-
tion-rather than broad control by a single party-often leads to the most
fruitful technological advance. 29' Relaxing exclusive rights on the part of
pioneer patentees may better achieve the conditions conducive to technolog-
ical progress. 29
1
Second, this proposal would spur original patentees to invest in improv-
ing their own patented inventions. As a general matter, overcompensating
patentees diminishes incentives to improve.292 Along these lines, the Second
Circuit has observed, "Many people believe that possession of unchallenged
economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy;
that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to
industrial progress.' '293 Under the current proposal, pioneer patentees, par-
ticularly those who obtain broad genus claims in a field, may not rest on
their laurels. The prospect of a subsequent party substantially improving on
their technology and appropriating a significant portion of the social value
of those improvements would spur pioneer patentees to continue to refine,
rethink, and extend their own creations.2 94 More precisely, it would encour-
age pioneer patentees to develop more advanced embodiments of their
inventions throughout the full scope of their patent claims.
While curtailing a pioneer patentee's exclusive rights may enhance in-
centives to improve, the accession doctrine's high "substantial
improvement" standard plays a valuable role in confining these incentives to
the upper end of the technical and economic spectrum. Many attempts to
improve on existing patents will not actually create substantial improve-
ments; these "minor" improvements largely inure to the benefit of pioneer
290. Merges & Nelson, supra note 31, at 872. This observation helps mitigate concerns
over potentially wasteful "racing" in which multiple firms engage in duplicative efforts to
improve a technology. Kitch, supra note 173. Whatever social losses arise from such racing
must be weighed against the benefits of more rapid technological improvement as well as
positive externalities arising from the "race" to improve.
291. As a corollary benefit, liability-rule protection of pioneer patents may reduce the
incentive for potential infringers to engage in inefficient patent searches. Sterk, supra note
214, at 1333; see also Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A Transac-
tional Model, 45 Hous. L. REV. 1165, 1189 (2008) ("When switching costs are high enough
and a substantial premium can be extracted by the patentee in a post-adjudication licensing
negotiation, the exploiting firm may invest excessively in searching for the patentee.").
292. Cf Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 89, at 1058.
293. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
294. In this fashion, this proposal avoids one primary objection to divided entitlements:
that such arrangements tend to reduce incentives for a property owner to improve his property
because it may be subject to liability-rule protection at a later date. See Ayres & Talley, supra
note 260, at 1085. Under this proposal, because a pioneer would avoid application of the ac-
cession rule by practicing the same or comparable improvement as an infringer, she faces
significant incentives to improve and exploit her intellectual property.
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patentees and provide questionable value for society as a whole. By insist-
ing on a high standard of technical and economic improvement, the
accession doctrine encourages truly substantive advances and discourages
wasteful and potentially duplicative activity on the part of potential infring-
ers.295 Additionally, by rendering accession difficult to invoke, this high
standard helps shore up the expected value of a patent, thus maintaining
strong initial incentives to invent. Like the patent principles to which it is
conceptually related (namely, blocking patents and the reverse doctrine of
equivalents), the "substantial improvement" standard helps mediate the in-
terests of original property owners and improvers, balancing incentives to
invent with incentives to improve on existing inventions.
Tellingly, international patent law already embraces elements of the ac-
cession insight. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS") authorizes countries to grant compulsory licens-
es to the owner of a "dependent" patent that cannot be practiced without
infringing another patent.296 Notably, one criterion for authorizing compul-
sory licenses is that "the invention claimed in the second [dependent] patent
shall involve an important technical advance of considerable economic sig-
nificance in relation to the invention claimed in the first patent. 297
Similarly, the domestic patent laws of several foreign countries include
compulsory "dependency license" provisions that provide for liability-rule
protection where an underlying patent dominates an improved technology.298
Some of these countries, such as Japan and the Netherlands, 299 have had
these provisions for decades, while others, such as Taiwan 3 ° and Brazil, 301
appear to have enacted them in response to corresponding provisions in the
295. Cf Kitch, supra note 173.
296. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31 (/), Dec.
15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; see Mitchell G. Stockwell, Implement-
ing eBay: New Problems in Guiding Judicial Discretion and Enforcing Patent Rights, 88 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 747, 758 (2006) (discussing the TRIPS Agreement); Joseph
A. Yosick, Note, Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1274, 1287-88 (same).
297. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 296, at art. 31(/)(i).
298. Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note 56, at 102-04; Howard C. Wegner, Patent
Harmonization, in PUB. No. C553, ABA-ALI COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: BIOTECHNOLO-
GY LAW 171, 223-25 (Am. Law Inst.-Am. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Continuing Prof'l Educ. ed.,
Nov. 8-9, 1990), available at Westlaw C554 ALI-ABA 171. Some countries, such as France,
Italy, and Japan, grant licenses for all blocking patents, while others, such as China and Swe-
den, grant such licenses only where the improvement makes a "significant technical advance"
over the existing patent. Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note 56, at 104. Interestingly, in
many cases, dependency licenses are contingent upon the pioneer patentee also receiving a
license to practice the improvement. Id. at 104-05.
299. See Wegner, supra note 298, at 223-25.
300. See Andy Y. Sun, From Pirate King to Jungle King: Transformation of Taiwan's
Intellectual Property Protection, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 67, 88-89
(1998).
301. Bruno Salama & Daniel Benoliel, Pharmaceutical Patent Bargains: The Brazilian
Experience, 18 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 633, 647 (2010).
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TRIPS Agreement. While granting such licenses has been historically
rare,302 anecdotal evidence suggests that some national authorities are be-
coming more willing to issue them.303 Ultimately, these statutory provisions
reflect the accession insight that the emergence of a substantial improve-
ment sometimes justifies curtailing a pioneer patentee's right to exclude.
2. Promoting Private Ordering
Although counterintuitive, this proposal for court-determined liability-
rule protection of patents may actually encourage greater negotiations be-
tween pioneer patentees and improvers. As a preliminary matter, consistent
with current eBay practice, a court applying this proposal would first direct
litigants to negotiate an ongoing royalty before imposing one itself. Never-
theless, even if a court were forced to calculate an ongoing royalty, such
liability-rule protection may have unexpected benefits. Commentators rou-
tinely cite the difficulty of government bodies-whether courts or
administrative tribunals-in accurately valuing damages, thus highlighting a
significant deficiency of liability rules relative to property rules.3" Under
this view, the comparative advantage of private parties over courts in valuing
patents favors protecting such assets with a property rule.305 Thus, property-
rule protection of patents is generally believed to be superior to liability-rule
protection for promoting voluntary negotiations between private parties.30 6
However, this may not necessarily be the case.
While private negotiations may yield more accurate valuations than
courts, it is not clear that property rules actually encourage more negotia-
tions than liability rules. This proposal to apply accession in remedies
analysis thus parallels work by Ian Ayres and Eric Talley demonstrating the
advantages of liability rules in promoting private ordering.30 7 This work
shows that liability rules and other forms of "divided legal entitlements"
encourage entitlement owners to disclose information regarding private val-
uations, thus reducing transaction costs related to imperfect information and
facilitating voluntary agreements.3 8 Essentially, liability rules create a "you
cut, I pick" scenario in which parties do not know if they will ultimately be
the seller or purchaser of an asset, thus reducing incentives for strategic
302. See, e.g., Wegner, supra note 298, at 222-23 (noting extremely rare grants of de-
pendency licenses in Japanese and Dutch patent law).
303. Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the
Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 Hous. L. REV. 1115, 1139 (2009).
304. See, e.g., Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note 56, at 99-100.
305. Kieff, supra note 89, at 733-34; Merges, Property Rules, supra note 50, at 2664.
306. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 260, at 1037 (referring to the "folklore" that "prop-
erty rules induce negotiation and contracting, while liability rules induce nonconsensual
taking, subsequent litigation, and judicially determined prices" (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).
307. See id.
308. Id. at 1029-32.
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behavior. 309 This analysis is particularly relevant to "thin markets" suscepti-
ble to strategic bargaining,"0 which often characterize patent licensing
negotiations.31 According to this view, liability rules may actually encour-
age more private ordering than property rules.
Moving from theory to practice, empirical evidence indicates that in lia-
bility-rule regimes, parties overwhelmingly negotiate agreements rather than
rely on court-determined compensation. In a recent study, Daniel Crane ex-
amined fifty-two antitrust consent decrees that contained liability-rule
provisions for patents or copyrights. 312 These provisions required defendants
to license intellectual property on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms,
but the relevant court reserved jurisdiction to determine appropriate com-
pensation if the parties could not agree.31 3 Notably, in only three of fifty-two
cases was there any indication that the court actually stepped in to determine
the royalty rate.314 In the vast majority of cases, parties successfully negoti-
ated some mutually acceptable agreement in the shadow of liability rules.
Ultimately, "[c]ourts rarely exercise their rate-setting powers even when
309. Id. at 1030, 1034. As this observation reveals, the setting of a "liability price" is not
necessarily the end of the story. It may be the case that the improver finds the price too high
and declines to exercise his option to practice the pioneer patent (as well as his own improve-
ment). If this would cause a loss on the part of the patentee, she may choose to "sweeten the
deal" by effectively lowering the ongoing royalty, thus inducing the improver to practice the
pioneer patent. Alternatively, if the patentee places a high value on exclusivity, she could pay
the improver to not exercise his option to practice the pioneer patent. And in blocking patents
scenarios, the pioneer could theoretically buy a license from the improver and practice the
improved invention herself.
310. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 202, at 15-16.
311. Of course, this thesis has not gone uncontested. Compare Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Comment, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105
YALE L.J. 221 (1995) (showing, among other criticisms, that Ayres and Talley's numerical
examples do not demonstrate the superiority of liability rules), with Ian Ayres & Eric Talley,
Comment, Distinguishing Between Consensual and Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability
Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235 (1995) (clarifying the dominance of liability rules in consensual
transactions by considering litigation costs). Importantly, even though Kaplow and Shavell
disagree with Ayres and Talley's thesis, they note that liability rules dominate property rules
when bargaining is impossible and suggest that liability rules still dominate property rules
when bargaining is possible but imperfect. Kaplow & Shavell, supra, at 232-33.
In addition, one potential limitation in applying Ayres and Talley's theory to accession
has to do with timing. In Ayres and Talley's framework, an entitlement holder either "bribes" a
potential taker not to take an entitlement or "sells" her entitlement at a price lower than the
damages amount. Ayres & Talley, supra note 260, at 1038. Thus, bargaining in this framework
proceeds in the presence of some known damage amount authorized by a third party, usually a
court. Such information, however, is not available if a court directs parties to negotiate an
ongoing royalty before calculating one itself. This limitation can be overcome in two ways.
First, a court can "signal" a nonbinding but likely royalty before directing parties to negotiate.
Second, parties can engage in another round of negotiation after a court declares its royalty,
thus determining whether or not the royalty will be enforced. See supra note 309.
312. Daniel A. Crane, Bargaining in the Shadow of Rate-Setting Courts, 76 ANTITRUST
L.J. 307, 311-12 (2009) [hereinafter Crane, Bargaining].
313. Crane, Intellectual Liability, supra note 23, at 294.
314. Crane, Bargaining, supra note 312, at 312.
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they retain them, ' 315 and liability rules appear to be highly consistent with
private ordering.
Notably, the inability of courts to precisely calculate damages-which is
ordinarily seen as a defect of liability rules-may have some salutary ef-
fects. While most commentators suggest that liability rules typically
undercompensate rights holders, it is possible that courts will err in the op-
posite direction and overcompensate rights holders, perhaps based on
inflated market benchmarks.316 As Crane observes, the ambiguous direction-
ality of court-ordered royalties presents an "unappetizing risk" for both
plaintiff and defendant, thus encouraging private negotiations." 7
Imprecision in calculating damages may encourage private ordering for
another reason as well. Ayres and Talley argue that untailored liability
rules-those that are divorced from actual measures of damages-function
best to promote private information disclosure and thus efficient contract-
ing.318 Put differently, perfect tailoring of damages reduces plaintiffs'
incentive to reveal information, as they are no worse off if there is a noncon-
sensual taking.319 As applied here, the inability of courts to accurately assess
damages in a liability-rule regime may not be as deleterious as first thought.
3. Realizing the Promise of Prospect Theory
Additionally, there may be efficiency gains when a substantially improv-
ing infringer is not subject to a pioneer patentee's strict right to exclude. As
noted, prospect theory helps to justify early, broad patents on the notion that
an initial patentee can then coordinate the development of a technology, in-
cluding related improvements. 30 Commentators have questioned this
assumption, noting the high information and transaction costs associated
with a single party managing the development of an early-stage technologi-
cal prospect.321
Relatedly, it is far from clear that the initial patentee is the best party to
develop an invention. This is especially true if a subsequent inventor has
substantially improved the invention in a manner in which the pioneer has
not.322 In this context, accession doctrine would play a salutary function by
shifting meaningful ownership of the improved invention to the party who
315. Id. at 308.
316. Crane, Intellectual Liability, supra note 23, at 293.
317. Id. at 293-94.
318. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 260, at 1065 ("Tailoring can exacerbate strategic
impediments to bargaining because tailoring gives the parties private information about the
legal consequences of nonconsensual taking.").
319. Id. at 1066.
320. Kitch, supra note 173, at 276.
321. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 135-36 (2004) [hereinafter Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post].
322. Merrill, supra note 16, at 490-91.
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has demonstrated a greater capacity to develop it.323 Put differently, acces-
sion helps ensure that the competence to develop an improved technology is
internalized within its boundaries, thus optimizing modularity in the alloca-
tion of property rights.324
Of course, the Coase theorem holds that in the absence of transaction
costs, initial allocations do not matter, and costless transactions will allow
resources to flow to their highest-valued use.3 25 However, a "true" reading of
the Coase theorem emphasizes that transaction costs do matter, and so legal
and regulatory systems should assign initial rights to the party best situated
to make good use of them.3"6 Accession helps achieve this result by granting
(relatively unobstructed) ownership of some technological improvement to a
party that, from all external indicia, is well positioned to develop it.327
Adapting Kitch's argument, mitigating the strict exclusivity of a pioneer
blocking patent and allowing the improver to coordinate the development of
an improved technology may better achieve the efficiency gains normally
associated with prospect theory.
On the other hand, one could argue that accession may subvert the bene-
fits of prospect theory insofar as pioneer patentees are discouraged from
communicating their inventions to others. After all, a patentee may fear that
others will substantially improve on his invention, thus foreclosing property-
rule protection of his patent. This may discourage entering into licensing
negotiations with outside parties, thus chilling commercialization. However,
several considerations suggest that this concern is overstated. First, by virtue
of obtaining a patent, the patentee has already "communicated" his inven-
tion to the technological community. Second, as discussed above,
infringement-including improving infringement-rarely involves copying
of a patented invention.328 Finally, accession may encourage pioneers to "get
ahead of the curve" and license their inventions to a wide number of poten-
tial improvers before they develop infringing improvements and can avail
themselves of the accession rule.
323. See id. at 489 ("Instead of holding a competition, ownership is awarded to someone
who has already demonstrated that she has the capacity to function as the owner of some
prominently connected asset.").
324. See Smith, Intellectual Property, supra note 16, at 1777.
325. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960).
326. Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note 56, at 82; Merges, Property Rules, supra note
50, at 2656-57; see also Clarisa Long, Proprietary Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter,
49 EMORY L.J. 823, 823 (2000) (discussing the importance of initial allocations of property
rights).
327. Cf Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 84, at 1783 ("If in some context
we thought that takers systematically had an advantage in developing an asset and that trans-
action costs were so high that the taker could not purchase the asset in a consensual
transaction.., then there would be a reason to worry about property rules protecting an enti-
tlement in existing owners.").
328. See Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 215, at 1465 (noting that "[m]ost defendants in




In addition, although open to debate, accession in the patent realm may
also enjoy the virtue of fairness. There is, as commentators have pointed out,
a distinctly Lockean tenor to physical property accession, which converts
protection of a resource from a property rule to a liability rule based on an
innocent improver's substantial, value-enhancing contributions to some
source material.3 29 Of course, fairness considerations would play out differ-
ently in the patent realm absent a good faith requirement on the part of
infringers.330 At its core, however, accession in the patent context also re-
wards improvers based on their substantial technical and economic
contributions to existing inventions. While modern patent law justifies itself
on utilitarian grounds,"' historical conceptions of patent law placed more
emphasis on rewarding value-enhancing labor and remunerating inventive
effort.33 2 Accession in the patent realm would help promote these objectives
by tying rights and remedies more closely to specific technological contribu-
tions.
Even acknowledging that accession would benefit some knowing in-
fringers, the differing moral baselines of physical property law and patent
law mitigate to some degree the perceived unfairness of such "intentional
takings." Unlike physical property, patent law already grants property rights
(in the form of blocking patents) to parties who significantly improve on
resources owned by others. Patent law thus cabins existing ownership inter-
ests to encourage subsequent improvement.333 It thereby reflects the notion
that the social benefits of improvement may trump a patentee's interest in
maintaining sole exclusive rights in all future iterations of an invention. The
present proposal would extend this principle by further rewarding (or at
least not unduly punishing) the inventive efforts of substantial improvers,
even those who knowingly infringe.334
329. See Smith, Intellectual Properly, supra note 16, at 1766-77 (noting the consistency
of accession with Lockean labor theory); cf Easterbrook, supra note 89, at 113 ("Treating
intellectual property as property should appeal not only to utilitarians but also libertarians.
Intellectual property is no less the fruit of one's labor than is physical property.").
330. See supra Section IV.A.I. As an empirical matter, it is worth noting that a substan-
tial proportion of infringers that invoke accession would likely qualify for good faith mental
status. See supra notes 215-217 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 103.
332. Mossoff, supra note 88, at 718.
333. Notably, copyright law operates differently than patent law by vesting exclusive
rights to "derivative works" in the original copyright holder. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006);
Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 31.
334. But see Merrill, supra note 16, at 497-99 (arguing that accession challenges
Lockean desert notions of property, for it "sweeps" in increments of value arising from hap-
penstance and pure luck and assigns them to some original property owner). While Merrill's
critique applies to most instances of accession, it seems somewhat inapposite to specificatio,




Viewed from a different perspective, the accession rule may prevent un-
just enrichment on the part of the initial patentee. The current regime is
biased in favor of pioneer patentees, who generally enjoy strict exclusive
rights vis A vis infringing improvers. In some cases, these rights enable pio-
neers to appropriate a disproportionate share of the value of an improver's
work.335 However, principles of fairness weigh against allowing a patentee
to command excessive gains resulting from another party's substantial tech-
nological innovation. 336
The requirement of compensation also appeals to fairness. An improver
of someone's property, whether an individual who converts wood to hoops
or one who substantially improves on some patented technology, does not
take the improved resource for free. Accession requires that the subsequent
party compensate the underlying property owner for the value of the source
material. Although such compensation may exhibit certain inadequacies,
accession nevertheless strives to "provide[] restitution as one intermediate
solution to the problem of intertwined inputs. '337 This "splitting" function
best achieves equity between two parties who have both contributed value to
some improved property.
B. Objections and Responses
Of course, this proposal to protect pioneer patents with a liability rule
when an infringer substantially improves on a protected technology must
address several prominent objections.
1. Disrupting Settled Expectations
First, critics might object to the seemingly radical nature of this pro-
posal, which diverges from the longstanding practice of protecting patents
with a right to exclude. As the Supreme Court has observed, courts should
be reluctant to "disrupt the settled expectations" of the inventive communi-
ty.338 However, the law has never viewed consistency for consistency's sake
as a great virtue. 339 Additionally, at least two considerations suggest that this
criticism is misplaced.
First, properly understood, the present proposal is quite modest. If an in-
fringing improvement is minor, then (all other things being equal)
335. Cf Lemley & Weiser, supra note 90, at 793 (noting the danger in holdout situations
that property owners "will use their power to refuse access to their property to demand a dis-
proportionate share of the revenue from the joint project").
336. See Newman, Patent Infringement, supra note 17, at 63.
337. Smith, Intellectual Property, supra note 16, at 1772.
338. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002)
(citing Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997)).
339. Cf Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)
("It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the
time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.").
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traditional equitable principles will continue to favor enjoining infringe-
ment. Furthermore, even for "significant" (i.e., independently patentable)
inventions, courts would have to determine if the improver's contributions
relative to the underlying patent were substantial enough to justify the ac-
cession rule. Thus, the vast majority of infringing improvement cases would
likely not implicate accession. Even if an improvement were substantial
enough to trigger accession, courts would first direct parties to voluntarily
negotiate a license before imposing royalties. The "remarkable" application
of a court-ordered liability rule would thus be a remedy of last resort. As
noted above, this proposal is best understood as an "action-forcing" mecha-
nism that still encourages private ordering, though it changes the
background conditions against which parties negotiate. 340
Second, after eBay, the ground has already shifted. Notwithstanding the
current proposal, eBay has introduced a nontrivial degree of uncertainty in
the prospect of obtaining an injunction after a finding of infringement.
While statistics are limited, in the first thirty cases applying eBay, district
courts issued permanent injunctions seventy-seven percent of the time,
compared with eighty-four percent for pre-eBay cases. 34 1 Additionally, cer-
tain patterns have begun to emerge, with denial of injunctive relief more
likely if the plaintiff and defendant do not directly compete, the plaintiff is a
nonpracticing entity, or the patented invention is only a small component of
the accused device.3 42 Thus, a lower probability of obtaining injunctive relief
is already a fact of life after eBay.34 3 The current proposal merely applies
this flexibility in a manner designed to promote technological improvement.
Against the notion of disrupting settled expectations, it is worth noting
that reducing liability based on significantly improving someone else's intel-
lectual property finds parallels in other fields as well. For example, one sees
a similar dynamic in copyright's fair use doctrine. 344 In certain instances in
which copyrighted content forms only a small portion of a new work, courts
have relied on fair use to find that the work does not infringe. 345 Additional-
ly, when a subsequent party engages in "transformative use" of a
copyrighted work, it may sometimes avoid liability under fair use.346 While
340. Cf Lee, Intellectual Infrastructure, supra note 103, at 107-08.
341. Robert M. Isackson, After 'eBay,' Injunctions Decrease, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 3, 2007, at
SI (citing Paul M. Janicke, HIPLA Professor of Law, Univ. of Hous. Law Ctr., Recent Devel-
opments, Strategies & Tactics in IP Damages Law, Presentation to the Intellectual Prop.
Owners Ass'n (Mar. 27, 2007)).
342. Chao, supra note 235, at 549-60.
343. Douglas Ellis et al., The Economic Implications (and Uncertainties) of Obtaining
Permanent Injunctive Relief After eBay v. MercExchange, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 437, 460 (2008);
Ernest Grumbles III et al., The Three Year Anniversary of eBay v. MercExchange: A Statistical
Analysis of Permanent Injunctions, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Nov. 2009, at 25.
344. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (allowing limited "fair use" of copyrighted material
without liability).
345. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 611 (2d
Cir. 2006) (focusing in particular on the "transformative" use of copyrighted material).
346. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 392 F. Supp. 2d 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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my proposal differs from fair use,3 47 it reflects a similar insight that in some
cases, transformative use of intellectual property should mitigate the full
brunt of the right to exclude.
2. Identifying Substantial Improvements and
Calculating an Ongoing Royalty
Critics of this proposal are likely to cite the technical difficulties of im-
plementing accession and the limited competence of courts to perform this
task. Along these lines, applying accession to patent infringement suits re-
quires at least two complicated sets of valuations. First, courts must
compare the values of a patented invention versus an improved technology
that infringes it.34 As Christopher Newman notes, the fact that underlying
patented inventions are novel, nonfungible assets that are not commonly
traded on robust markets renders valuations particularly difficult. 349 Second,
if a court deems that accession is triggered and denies an injunction, it must
be prepared to calculate an ongoing royalty to compensate the pioneer pa-
tentee for prospective infringement.35 ° As I have noted in other work, eBay's
347. Notably, Maureen O'Rourke has proposed a doctrine of fair use for patent law.
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177
(2000). While I note fair use for conceptual comparison, my proposal is not a patent analogue to
that copyright doctrine. First, I propose accession as a narrow, tailored mechanism for addressing
infringing improvements rather than as a broad standard for allowing unauthorized uses of
patented inventions more generally. Second, while fair use eliminates liability (and any obliga-
tion to provide a remedy), under my proposal defendants would still be liable for infringement
and would have to compensate the plaintiff. In this respect, I share common ground with
O'Rourke's adaptation of fair use to patent law. Id. at 1209 (noting that in some cases, a party
claiming fair use would be obligated to compensate the patentee). However, while O'Rourke's
article was written prior to eBay, my proposal for liability-rule protection is situated in the
Supreme Court's current injunctions framework as well as recent case law addressing damag-
es.
348. Cf Newman, Patent Infringement, supra note 17, at 88 (noting, in the physical
property context, that accession requires courts to "evaluate the relative contributions of the
original resource and the improver's contributions" to an improved asset).
349. Id. at 113-14; see also Ayres & Talley, supra note 260, at 1092 ("Intellectual prop-
erty often entails a significant amount of thin-market bargaining."); Merges, Blocking Patents,
supra note 56, at 77 ("[B]y definition each asset covered by a patent is in some sense
unique-a characteristic guaranteed by various requirements for protectability in the patent
statute.").
350. The difficulty of calculating reasonable royalties for past infringement has attracted
widespread academic attention. See, e.g., Golden, Patent Trolls, supra note 235, at 2116-17
("Given courts' difficulties with assessing reasonable royalties, there remains a strong argu-
ment for a rebuttable presumption of injunctive relief in all cases where infringement has been
proven and there is a significant threat that it will continue or resume."). See generally Antho-
ny T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 35 U. Cui. L. REV. 351, 360 (1978) (noting that "it
would be very difficult and expensive for a court to acquire the information necessary" to
tailor damages exactly to the harm suffered by a plaintiff). Such difficulty is compounded by
the fact that juries rather than judges ordinarily calculate reasonable royalties. The highly
factual nature of such determinations, as well as the frequent absence of detailed accounts of
calculations, can render them difficult to review, either on a motion for judgment as a matter
of law (JMOL) or on appeal. Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to
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use of a holistic standard instead of a bright line rule equating infringement
with injunctions tends to complicate patent adjudication.35' However, recent
patent jurisprudence dealing with both injunctions and royalties suggests
that courts possess the tools and acumen to apply the accession insight.
First, as noted above, courts applying eBay have already gained experi-
ence in weighing the relative values of differing technical contributions to
an infringing technology. 35 2 This practice arises from Justice Kennedy's
(nonbinding) guidance that courts should consider whether a patented inven-
tion is merely one component of a larger system when determining the
appropriateness of injunctive relief.35 3 While accession involves an analyti-
cally distinct concern-weighing the relative value of an improved species
relative to a claimed genus-comparative valuations are already part and
parcel of the eBay analysis.
In a broader sense, while I share Newman's concern over relative valua-
tions, they need not unduly limit applications of accession. When a pioneer
patentee does not nonexclusively license an invention, valuing that invention
is indeed difficult.354 However, even where precise valuations are not availa-
ble, other proxies may inform the comparative valuation analysis. Where a
product derives a significant share of its value from a single patented inven-
tion, attributes of the product-such as price, profit, and market share-may
be useful proxies for valuing the underlying technologies.355 For example,
comparing these metrics between diodes and triodes, or between traditional-
ly purified EPO and recombinant EPO, can provide useful indications of the
relative value of an improved technology over a basic patented invention. In
an indirect fashion, an improvement's technical advance over a basic patent
may also inform an analysis of its marginal economic value. For example, in
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Amgen's ability to produce EPO
from recombinant DNA greatly enhanced its ability to serve the patient
market for this hormone.356 It bears emphasizing as well that accession
Calculating Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 627, 632 (2010). As we will
see, however, courts are becoming more sophisticated in reviewing reasonable royalty deter-
minations. See infra notes 366-372 and accompanying text. Furthermore, additional tools are
available to courts to determine ongoing royalties for prospective infringement. See infra notes
373-376 and accompanying text.
351. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 62-63 (2010). In a
tautological sense, the difficulties of calculating damages are reflected in the eBay standard
itself: the fact that damages are difficult to quantify is a factor that weighs in favor of simply
granting an injunction. Id. at 58.
352. See supra Section IV.B.
353. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006); Paice I,
No. 2:04-CV-21 I-DF, 2006 WL 2385139 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Paice II).
354. Newman, Patent Infringement, supra note 17, at 69.
355. See supra Section IV.A. Of course, this analysis would be complicated by other
factors-such as marketing prowess-that may also affect price, profit, and market share. See
Golden, Remedies, supra note 32, at 536.
356. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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should only apply where the value of some improvement is substantial
relative to the value of the patent on which it improves.3 57 This will most
likely be apparent for "transformative" improvements that change the nature
of some patented technology. In "close calls," however, courts would be free
to conclude that the equities favored traditional property-rule protection of
the pioneer patent.
Second, longstanding and recent case law concerning reasonable royalty
determinations can guide more accurate calculations of ongoing royalties. It
is important to note in this context that reasonable royalties for past in-
fringement differ from ongoing royalties for prospective infringement.35 s
For example, reasonable royalties represent "damages" that typically are
subject to jury determination under the Seventh Amendment. 9 However,
the Federal Circuit has indicated that ongoing royalties do not necessarily
constitute "damages" that must be determined by juries.360 Notwithstanding
these differences, as a normative matter, commentators have argued that
similar principles should inform royalty determinations for both past and
prospective infringement.3 6' As a practical matter, courts are likely to turn to
the familiar practice of calculating reasonable royalties for past infringement
when determining ongoing royalties.
Along these lines, several longstanding features of reasonable royalty ju-
risprudence facilitate application of the accession rule. The guiding standard
for calculating reasonable royalties arises from Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
United States Plywood Corp., which establishes a fifteen-factor test for de-
termining appropriate compensation for past infringement.362 Factor thirteen
instructs courts to consider "[t]he portion of the realizable profit that should
be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements,
the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or im-
357. Such evaluations may require courts to engage patented inventions more substan-
tively, thus achieving a deeper understanding of their technological contributions, rather than
simply focusing on the literal text of patent claims. For a fuller exposition of the related prac-
tice of "substantive claim construction," see Peter Lee, Substantive Claim Construction as a
Patent Scope Lever, I IP THEORY 100 (2010).
358. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623-24 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
359. See, e.g., Bos. Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 550 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1119-
23 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
360. Paice I1, 504 F.3d 1293, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
361. Lemley, Ongoing Royalties, supra note 229.
362. 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1119-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
This test has received a fair share of criticism, and the Federal Circuit has observed that
"[d]etermining a fair and reasonable royalty is often ... a difficult judicial chore, seeming
often to involve more the talents of a conjurer than those of a judge." Fromson v. W. Litho
Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988); cf Golden, Patent Trolls, supra
note 235, at 2150-51 (describing the difficulties courts have faced when calculating prospec-
tive reasonable royalties under Georgia-Pacific). In light of these difficulties, commentators
have proposed improvements to reasonable royalty determinations that promise to enhance the
accuracy of both past and prospective royalty calculations. See, e.g., Durie & Lemley, supra
note 350, at 629 (distilling the Georgia-Pacific test to three central inquiries).
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provements added by the infringer."'363 Thus, established reasonable royalty
precedent already reflects the notion of proportional compensation that lies
at the heart of the accession insight.3" In addition to this substantive com-
patibility, procedural aspects of reasonable royalty calculations enhance the
feasibility of applying accession. Under existing case law, patentees bear the
burden of establishing damages,365 thus relieving courts of the responsibility
of calculating royalties on a blank slate. This practice of relying on litigants
for informational inputs can also ease the calculation of ongoing royalties.
Turning to recent developments, decisions by the Federal Circuit over
the past several years have enhanced the analytical rigor with which courts
determine reasonable royalties.3 66 For example, in ResQNet.com, Inc. v.
Lansa, Inc.,367 the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's award of roy-
alties for both past and ongoing infringement. The Federal Circuit first
articulated the general rule that "the trial court must carefully tie proof of
damages to the claimed invention's footprint in the marketplace."3 68 The
court then rejected the reasonable royalty calculation submitted by the pa-
tentee's expert in the proceeding below, noting that the expert "used licenses
with no relationship to the claimed invention to drive the royalty rate up to
unjustified double-digit levels. 369
Similarly, in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., the Federal Cir-
cuit rejected the patentee's proffered licenses because "some of the license
agreements [were] radically different from the hypothetical agreement under
consideration. '370 Furthermore, in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the
Federal Circuit rejected a "25 percent rule of thumb" as a baseline for de-
termining reasonable royalties as "fundamentally flawed" and "arbitrary.
371
Together, these decisions promise greater scrutiny of reasonable royalty cal-
culations and more accurate valuations of infringed patents. Again, while
calculating reasonable royalties for past infringement differs from doing so
363. Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120 (emphasis added).
364. Cf Durie & Lemley, supra note, 350, at 637 ("[A) reasonable royalty designed to
mimic the results of a hypothetical license negotiation between patentee and infringer should
be strongly influenced by the value that the patented technology actually contributes."). Tell-
ingly, proportionality analysis has informed recent congressional proposals to reform the law
of patent infringement damages. See, e.g., H.R. 1908, 110th Cong., sec. 5(b)(2) (2007) (stating
that courts must ensure that royalties are "applied only to that economic value properly at-
tributable to the patent's specific contribution over the prior art").
365. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
366. See Michael J. Kasdan & Joseph Casino, Federal Courts Closely Scrutinizing and
Slashing Patent Damages Awards, 2010 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 24, http://www.patentlyo.comI
patent/2010/03/federal-courts-closely-scrutinizing-and-slashing-patent-damage-awards.html
(summarizing recent cases).
367. 594 E3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
368. ResQNet.com, 594 F.3d at 869.
369. Id. at 869-70. In general, relying on experts for valuations presents a challenge
because of the confidential nature of licensing agreements that often inform their calculations.
See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 47, at 2022-23.
370. 580 F.3d at 1327.
371. 632 F.3d 1292, 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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for prospective infringement, courts are likely to rely on the former when
engaging in the latter. Greater sophistication in determining reasonable roy-
alties will help courts calculate appropriate ongoing compensation upon
denial of injunctive relief. Notably, the Federal Circuit has already extended
these principles to apply greater scrutiny to the calculation of ongoing royal-
ties.
372
Moving beyond the realm of reasonable royalties, additional tools are
available to courts to determine ongoing royalties. While a jury's determina-
tion of a reasonable royalty may provide helpful guidance, the Federal
Circuit has held that courts are not bound by the jury's award in setting an
ongoing royalty.373 For example, the proportional contribution of a pioneer
patent to the value of an improved technology may change over time, ren-
dering the reasonable royalty for past infringement an imperfect measure of
compensation for prospective infringement. 374 Accordingly, courts may de-
viate from jury findings when determining an ongoing royalty.375 Along
these lines, courts may consider additional evidence "to account for any ad-
ditional economic factors arising from the imposition of an ongoing
royalty.
3 76
Of course, valuation is complicated by the fact that patented inventions,
and their improvements, are typically not fungible commodities traded on
robust markets.3 77 However, legal damages aim for a reasonable royalty,378
not absolute precision, and similar principles should inform prospective
compensation. If an injunction is denied in a particular case, the patentee,
who generally bears the burden of establishing compensable harm, has am-
ple motivation to provide the requisite analysis to justify a particular
royalty.379 Ultimately, the greater scrutiny that courts now apply to royalty
calculations promises more accurate valuations. To be sure, this proposal
will apply more easily to some factual scenarios than others. In complex
systems composed of many patented components (e.g., semiconductors), it
may be prohibitively difficult to ascertain the relative value of some "im-
372. See, e.g., Paice 11, 504 F.3d 1293, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (reversing and remanding a
district court's ongoing royalty calculation because of inadequate support).
373. Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
374. See Tim Carlton, Note, The Ongoing Royalty: What Remedy Should a Patent Hold-
er Receive When a Permanent Injunction is Denied?, 43 GA. L. REv. 543, 571-72 (2009);
Lemley, Ongoing Royalties, supra note 229, at 8.
375. See Paice //, 504 F.3d at 1317 (Rader, J., concurring) ("[Plre-suit and post-
judgment acts of infringement are distinct, and may warrant different royalty rates given the
change in the parties' legal relationship and other factors.").
376. Id. at 1315 (majority opinion). For additional flexibility, courts may also reserve the
authority to periodically recalculate the royalty rate based on updated information and valua-
tions. See Carlton, supra note 374, at 572.
377. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
378. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
379. Additionally, as a theoretical matter, untailored damages may have surprisingly
salutary effects in reducing at least one type of transaction cost-information costs-in nego-
tiations between litigants. See supra notes 318-319 and accompanying text.
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provement" compared to one or several patented inputs.380 For a subset of
cases in which calculating royalties is feasible, however, this proposal to
apply accession doctrine holds significant promise.
3. Increasing Incentives to Infringe for Improvers
Critics may also argue that any rule that rewards (or decreases costs for)
infringers will encourage more infringement. In doing so, critics might note
the oft-cited public interest in maintaining respect for patents by enforcing
strict rights to exclude.3"' Improvers, motivated by strategic considerations,
may simply elect to infringe patents rather than seek licenses, content in the
expectation that they would only face an ongoing royalty rather than an in-
junction upon a finding of infringement. Here again, however, criticisms are
overstated.
First, the accession rule's high standard of "substantial improvement"
significantly constrains the universe of infringers eligible to benefit from
accession considerations. This high standard would screen out minor im-
provers from potential liability-rule treatment. Accession would be a rare
intervention reserved for substantial technical and economic improvements
over some basic patented invention.
Second, as noted above, willful infringement doctrine can discipline the
behavior of the subset of improving infringers who act with "objective reck-
lessness" with respect to an existing patent.3 82 Under current law, such
infringers could face up to treble damages for past infringement.383 While
not all improving infringers will qualify as willful infringers, the prospect of
enhanced damages provides a strong incentive for parties unsure of their
status to negotiate a license with a patentee.
Third, and more broadly, some types of infringement are simply not as
socially harmful as others. The incentive-producing, investment-protecting
rationale for strict exclusive rights is strongest in cases of direct copying, 384
when one entity completely free rides on the inventive efforts of another.
However, substantial improvement of an existing technology represents a
different kind of infringement. Here, the costs to the patentee and incentives
to invent more generally must be weighed against the significant social
gains from accelerating the introduction of a substantially improved
380. See Newman, Patent Infringement, supra note 17, at 113-14.
381. See, e.g., Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting
that the "encouragement of investment-based risk is the fundamental purpose of the patent
grant, and is based directly on the right to exclude").
382. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). See su-
pra notes 226-229 and accompanying text.
383. See 35 U.S.C. § 284.
384. Of course, a patent regime cannot limit itself to only prohibiting exact imitation, for
"the unscrupulous copyist" would "make unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitu-
tions in the patent which, though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter




technology. This is particularly pertinent given that the nature of patent
claiming tends to "sweep in" broad parcels of technological territory beyond
what a pioneer inventor may have actually created. 3 5 As a rough social cal-
culus, efficiency interests may justify relaxing traditional property-rule
protection of patents in order to encourage the development and dissemina-
tion of substantial improvements.
4. Decreasing Incentives to Invent for Pioneers
This proposal may impact incentives not only for improvers but also for
pioneers.' In particular, critics might contend that liability-rule protection
of patents would diminish initial incentives to invent.387 Along these lines,
commentators note that liability rules typically undercompensate property
owners.388 Among other considerations, such valuations do not capture idio-
syncratic value, consequential losses, and value gaps between the best-known
uses of a resource and the best publicly verifiable uses of that resource.389 This
gap between private and court-determined valuations may chill initial incen-
tives to invent.
However, several considerations suggest that this critique may be over-
stated. First, although strategic value based on the threat of holdup may
enhance incentives to invent, it is far from clear that this is the type of value
that the patent system should endeavor to compensate. 390 Second, and more
generally, the chain of events and probabilities necessary to reach liability-
rule protection of a patent is rather long and tenuous. The relatively low
385. See supra Section I.A.
386. Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note 56, at 101-02 ("Any scholar who writes on
intellectual property rights and who advocates that some rights should be scaled back can
anticipate the criticism that incentives will be harmed.").
387. See Cotter, supra note 71, at 1164-65 (describing the argument that reasonable
royalty compensation creates a situation in which "it is the downstream users who are in effect
holding up the patentee for a share of the surplus, and in so doing are discouraging socially
optimal investments upstream").
388. E.g., Crane, Intellectual Liability, supra note 23, at 255; Richard A. Epstein, A
Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2093
(1997); Richard A. Epstein, The Property Rights Movement and Intellectual Property, REGU-
LATION, Winter 2008-2009, at 58, 62; Lemley & Weiser, supra note 90, at 787-88; Newman,
Patent Infringement, supra note 17, at 76-77.
389. Newman, Patent Infringement, supra note 17, at 79-82; see Smith, Property and
Property Rules, supra note 84, at 1763-64 (noting that property rules allow owners to "bet" on
potential value increases in the future, as compared with liability rules, which involve imme-
diate valuation of an asset). In addition to undercompensating property owners, liability rules
also impose substantial administrative costs on the public body that must apply them. New-
man, Patent Infringement, supra note 17, at 81-82.
390. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396-97 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting that the threat of an injunction can create leverage that leads to "exorbi-
tant" licensing fees); see also Golden, Patent Trolls, supra note 235, at 2139-40 (suggesting
that rewarding "holdout" value is a cost against which the traditional benefits of injunctive
relief should be weighed); Shapiro, supra note 71, at 303 (arguing that the patent system
should compensate patentees by means other than "inefficiently enabling patent hold-up").
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likelihood that some future infringement would result in liability-rule pro-
tection of a patent would tend to dampen chilling effects on patentees'
initial incentives to invent. 391' Third, this proposal is best understood not as
displacing private ordering, but as changing the baseline conditions against
which negotiations take place. Private parties would still have ample oppor-
tunities to negotiate a mutually beneficial agreement. 3
92
Even if a court imposes an ongoing royalty, it is not clear that such com-
pensation would detrimentally impact incentives to invent. Empirical
evidence from the pharmaceutical industry suggests that one form of liabil-
ity-rule protection-compulsory licensing-does not diminish innovation.3 93
Additionally, compulsory licenses have existed for decades in certain copy-
right contexts,394 with little empirical evidence of chilling effects on creative
productivity. Relatedly, between a world in which no licensing agreement
arises and one in which a patentee obtains court-determined ongoing royalties,
the patentee may be better off in the latter. The gains from court-ordered roy-
alties may be particularly pronounced if, as Robert Merges suggests, the
pioneer technology can maintain a robust market position as a low-cost alter-
native to the improvement. 395
Finally, rather than characterizing this proposal as decreasing incentives
to invent, it may be more accurate to say that it creates an additional incen-
tive for pioneer patentees to continue working on and improving their
inventions. 396 After all, if a pioneer patentee practices the same improved
technology as an infringer, an injunction will typically be forthcoming.
391. Cf Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note 56, at 102-03 (suggesting that because of
various contingencies, liability-rule protection of patents is unlikely to significantly impact
incentives to invent). It bears emphasizing that, for most factual predicates, patentees would
continue to obtain property-rule protection of their patents. Thus, the investment-dampening
effect of this proposal is somewhat intermediate between that of a pure property-rule regime
and a pure liability-rule regime, which is characteristic of so-called pliability rules. See Bell &
Parchomovsky, supra note 202, at 27.
392. This is not to suggest that such agreements would necessarily be optimal for either
party. In particular, John Golden observes that "information asymmetries appear most likely to
disfavor the patent holder in negotiations, suggesting that regardless of any inherent skill at
bargaining, the patent holder will probably be substantially handicapped in its ability to
achieve an especially favorable negotiated result." Golden, Patent Trolls, supra note 235, at
2133. Furthermore, there is a concern that court-ordered damage awards will function as a
ceiling on valuations that will bias negotiated settlements downward. Moreover, if court-
ordered awards are based on negotiated settlements (and vice versa), this downward bias may
expand over time. Golden, Remedies, supra note 32, at 568-69. To the extent that courts are
aware of these biases, however, they may attempt to counteract them with more searching
analyses of the comparable licensing agreements used as the basis for determining ongoing
royalties.
393. Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853 (2003).
394. Crane, Intellectual Liability, supra note 23, at 259-63.
395. Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note 56, at 79-80. In this case, the extra royalty
stream from the improvement may be "pure gravy" to the pioneer patentee. Id. at 80.




In addition to pragmatically reforming patent law's treatment of techno-
logical improvement, this proposal to apply the accession insight in patent
remedies analysis also holds several implications for patent law and theory.
A. Adapting the Principles of the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents
Close observers of patent law will recognize that this proposal repre-
sents a subtle but significant variation on the reverse doctrine of equivalents.
As noted above, under the reverse doctrine of equivalents:
[W]here a device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that
it performs the same or a similar function in a substantially different way,
but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim, the doctrine of
equivalents may be used [in reverse] to restrict the claim and defeat the pa-
tentee's action for infringement. 391
In theory, the reverse doctrine of equivalents operates as a safety valve to
excuse a radical improvement from liability even though it technically in-
fringes the claims of an existing patent.3 98 As we have seen, however, the
Federal Circuit has essentially declared it a moribund doctrine. 99
However, this proposal to apply accession doctrine in remedies analysis
captures much of the insight of the reverse doctrine of equivalents. Recall
that in its starkest formulation, accession doctrine shifts title to some im-
proved item when the improver has transformed the item into a different
"species,"4° as when an improver transforms standing trees to barrel hoops.
In this situation, return of the original property is literally impossible be-
cause its identity has fundamentally changed. Similarly, transformation is
critical to classic descriptions of the reverse doctrine of equivalents. In
Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, the Supreme Court noted:
[I]f the [defendant] has so far changed the principle of the device that the
claims of the patent, literally construed, have ceased to represent his actual
invention, he is as little subject to be adjudged an infringer as one who has
violated the letter of a statute has to be convicted, when he has done noth-
ing in conflict with its spirit and intent."
397. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950).
398. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
399. See supra note 78.
400. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
401. 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898) (emphasis added); see also Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v.
Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (observing that the reverse
doctrine of equivalents applies where the accused device, though literally infringing, "has
been so changed that it is no longer the same invention"); SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp.
of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that the reverse doctrine of equivalents
inquires "into whether a product has been so far changed in principle that it performs the same
or similar function in a substantially different way").
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While technically one could still subject the transformed invention to the
full exclusive rights of the underlying patent, equity weighs against doing
so. Thus, in both the accession and reverse doctrine of equivalents contexts,
an infringer's radical transformation of some existing (intellectual) property
justifies mitigating liability.4°2
The key difference lies in the extent to which these approaches mitigate
liability. Under the reverse doctrine of equivalents, a party completely
avoids liability and concomitantly bears no obligation to compensate the
patentee for continuing to practice his technology. Under the current pro-
posal, however, considerations similar to the reverse doctrine of equivalents
would convert patent protection from a property rule to a liability rule. Ac-
cordingly, the improver would be liable for patent infringement and must
compensate the pioneer.
Considering "radical transformation" at the remedies stage rather than at
the liability stage may mitigate the harshness of the reverse doctrine of
equivalents. It bears emphasizing that this proposal does not intend to re-
place the reverse doctrine of equivalents, which in theory plays an important
role in limiting patent rights. However, given that the doctrine exists more in
principle than in practice, the current proposal makes mitigating liability
based on transformative infringement more palatable for courts. The drastic
nature of the reverse doctrine of equivalents-which completely relieves a
party of any liability (and remedy) for literal infringement-likely contrib-
utes to courts' reluctance to apply it. In addition, liability-rule protection
may be particularly appropriate for improvements that demonstrate a sub-
stantial degree of transformation yet do not meet the threshold for the
reverse doctrine of equivalents. In essence, the accession rule offers courts a
middle zone of flexibility between the poles of no infringement liability and
full property-rule protection of an infringed patent. Given the intermediate
nature of liability-rule protection, courts may be emboldened to actually
inquire into the relative contributions of a pioneer and improving inventor
when determining appropriate infringement remedies.
B. Patents as Property Revisited
While this Article offers a practical proposal to enhance patent law's
treatment of technological improvement, it also sheds light on the broader
relationship between patents and property. As noted above, many have
criticized comparisons of patents and property by highlighting the funda-
mentally different kinds of subject matter falling within these domains.
Patents cover nonrival, intangible technical designs, while property law
covers rivalrous, tangible resources. Given the nonrival nature of patented
inventions, moreover, common justifications for strict exclusive rights-
such as averting a tragedy of the commons-lose significant force.4 3
402. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 16, at 1528 (drawing an analogy between
"expressive accession" in copyright and the reverse doctrine of equivalents in patent law).
403. See supra Section II.A.
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However, this Article highlights a central irony: accession-a property
doctrine-is arguably more appropriate for patents than for physical proper-
ty. In the tangible property context, accession results in physical
dispossession of some improved item from its "original" owner. Given the
nonrival nature of patented inventions, however, the pioneer patentee who is
subject to the accession rule does not physically lose anything.' To be sure,
she may lose some expectation value from her patent, but she can still make
much productive use of her invention (as opposed to the landowner who
loses his wood to the mistaken improver). 45 In some sense, therefore, the
nonrival nature of intellectual property provides opportunities for shared
access and simultaneous exploitation that physical property does not.
Social welfare concerns also render patents even more amenable to ac-
cession than physical property. Among the several rationales informing
accession is protecting productive effort. George Wetherbee, for example,
productively transformed $25 worth of trees into approximately $700 worth
of barrel hoops. While his contribution to social welfare may have been sig-
nificant, it is likely dwarfed by introducing substantially improved
technologies to the marketplace. Encouraging the development of ingenious
new train brakes, revolutionary triodes as opposed to diodes, and a host of
other technological improvements promises significant social benefits.
While chilling effects on pioneer patentees must be taken into account, ac-
cession doctrine can help accelerate the development and dissemination of
such improvements. Ultimately, in the accession context, patents may be
even better suited to property doctrine than property itself.
CONCLUSION
In the physical realm, unauthorized improvement of someone else's
property may result in title shifting to the improver, contingent upon com-
pensating the original owner for the value of the underlying materials.
This Article argues that recent developments in the law of patent infringe-
ment remedies suggest that this insight should be adapted to the
intellectual property realm as well. In particular, it proposes applying ac-
cession doctrine-with some modification-to deny injunctive relief when
an infringer substantially improves on an underlying patented invention.
When the infringing technology represents a substantial technical and
economic advance that dominates the value of the underlying patent, equi-
ty weighs against strict enforcement of the pioneer's right to exclude and
in favor of compelling the improver to compensate the pioneer for the
market value of her patented invention. While physical property accession
insists that defendants act in good faith, the unique characters of patent
404. See supra Section IV.A. 1; Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 Hous.
L. REV. 621, 622 (2003); cf Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 16, at 1527 ("An author who
borrows from another's work to create an exceptionally creative work of her own does not
appropriate the copied work in the traditional property sense.").
405. See Crane, Intellectual Liability, supra note 23, at 297.
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law and the eBay framework, as well as the availability of other safeguards,
counsel against importing such a requirement into the patent realm.
This proposal would ameliorate the deficiencies of the current blocking
patents regime as well as the reverse doctrine of equivalents. Regarding
blocking patents, the prospect of property-rule protection by a pioneer pa-
tentee may frustrate negotiations or result in skewed distributions of rents
that diminish incentives to improve. While the reverse doctrine of equiva-
lents exists in theory to relieve liability where a literally infringing invention
operates in a radically different manner, courts rarely invoke it. The current
proposal for liability-rule protection in the context of substantial technologi-
cal improvement would both rationalize the balance of power in blocking
patents scenarios as well as render the principles of the reverse doctrine of
equivalents more palatable to courts and patentees alike.
By extending liability-rule protection to pioneer patents in appropriate
contexts, this approach promises to enhance patent law's treatment of
technological improvement. While liability rules give rise to concerns over
third-party valuations of technological assets, a liability-rule regime may
be fully consistent with direct negotiations between patentees and prospec-
tive licensees and the related efficiency gains of private ordering. And even
when a court must step in to enforce a liability rule, recent jurisprudence
relating to injunctions and damages provides useful guidance for applying
the accession insight. In a broader sense, patents may be particularly well-
suited to accession given the nonrival nature of technology; an improving
infringer who avails herself of the accession rule does not physically dispos-
sess the patentee of anything. While patents and property diverge in many
ways, accession is one area in which patent law can benefit substantially
from the insights of traditional property law.
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